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                ABSTRACT 
 
THE LOUISIANA EDUCATIONAL ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (LEAP):  A 
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA’S 
HIGH STAKES TESTING POLICY 
by 
              Erica L. DeCuir 
 
 
 High stakes testing is popularly examined in educational research, but 
contemporary analyses tend to reflect a qualitative or quantitative research design (e.g., 
Au, 2007; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006; Gamble, 2010).  Exhaustive debate over the 
relative success or failure of high stakes testing is often framed between competing 
visions of epistemological constructs, and the historical foundations of high stakes testing 
policies are rarely explored.  The origins of high stakes testing can be traced to local 
school reform efforts in states like Louisiana, and investigating the roots of high stakes 
testing at the state level contextualizes the national debate on student assessment in 
research and scholarship.   
 Using historical research methods, this project details the local campaign to 
implement the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as Louisiana’s 
comprehensive high stakes testing program. Enacted under state law in 1986, the LEAP 
is a series of K-12 student assessments aligned to prescriptive state standards.  The LEAP 
is among the nation’s longest comprehensive high stakes testing programs and is the 
centerpiece to Louisiana’s school accountability system.  The narrative of its 
development offers critical insight into the overarching rationales for high stakes testing 
that continue to drive accountability policies throughout the country.  This study 
  
interweaves sociological and political history into a singular chronological record of the 
LEAP.  Historical research methodology informs this study by establishing the basis for 
data collection and analysis.  Historical research method is the systematic collection and 
evaluation of primary source data in order to determine trends, causes, or effects of past 
events (Gay, 1996; Lucey, 1984).  Methods used in this research investigation include 
document analysis and oral history interviews.  Multiple data sources are used to gain a 
thorough understanding of the historical context surrounding the implementation of the 
LEAP.  The LEAP functions as both a student assessment program and policy of school 
accountability, and the story of its development is an important narrative within the field 
of high stakes testing research and scholarship.  
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           CHAPTER 1 
                   INTRODUCTION 
 
Defining the Problem 
 Educational researchers have devoted extensive study to the applications, effects, 
and implications of high stakes testing.  Many researchers criticize high stakes testing for 
narrowing curriculum and imposing “drill and kill” methods in classroom practice (e.g., 
Au, 2007; Cochran-Smith & Lytle, 2006; Kozol, 2006; McNeil, 2001; Ravitch, 2010).  
Surveys of K-12 teacher perceptions are consistent with the findings in this line of 
research, and they often indicate teachers’ contradictory views toward high stakes 
assessments (Abrams, Pedulla, & Madaus, 2003; Jones & Egley, 2006; Wellman, 2007), 
despite the tests’ strong influence on instructional decisions (Faulkner & Cook, 2006; 
White, Sturtevant & Dunlap, 2003).  By contrast, those researching positive trends in 
student test scores found evidence of increased academic performance for racial 
minorities (Roach, 2006) and lower-income students (Flesche, 2008; Winters, 2008).  In 
respect to the legitimacy of high stakes testing as authentic models of student assessment, 
researchers have also examined issues of validity and reliability (Hattie, Jaeger, & Bond, 
1999; Moss, 1994; Popham, 2008). 
 Prior research on high stakes testing tends to reflect a methodological approach 
consistent with either a qualitative or quantitative design.  Exhaustive debate over the 
relative success or failure of high stakes testing is often framed between competing 
visions of epistemological and theoretical constructs, and the historical foundations of 
high stakes testing policies are rarely explored.  Few research studies ask the critical and 
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overarching questions such as: Why is high stakes testing popularly regarded as a valid 
assessment of student learning and policy of school accountability? Where did high 
stakes testing originate and what are the lasting implications of its development? Who 
were instrumental in campaigning for high stakes testing and why did they support it?  
High stakes testing continues a very long tradition of standards-based curricula and 
testing in the United States, but the most immediate origins of this national movement 
can be traced to local school reform efforts in states like Texas, Louisiana, and Florida.  
The philosophy and rationale underlying high stakes testing took root within these states, 
and uncovering the foundations of high stakes testing at the state level contextualizes the 
national debate on student assessment in research and scholarship.  
 
Overview of the Study 
 Using historical research methodology, I examine how and why the LEAP was 
established as a high stakes testing program in Louisiana’s public schools.  The LEAP 
program was first enacted under state law in 1986 and included an assortment of K-12 
assessments aligned to prescriptive state standards.  The law required local school 
systems to use the LEAP K-8 assessments as a principal criterion in promotional 
decisions, but local school officials retained final authority in student promotion.  
Successful scores on the LEAP eleventh grade test, called the graduate exit exam (GEE), 
were required to receive a high school diploma in public schools throughout the state.  
The LEAP was redesigned under state law in 1999 as Leap for the 21st Century (LEAP 
21), and it became the centerpiece to the state’s new school accountability system.  The 
LEAP 21 program introduced more rigorous testing and increased the stakes associated 
3 
 
with student failure.  All fourth and eighth graders who failed the LEAP 21 tests were 
automatically retained regardless of classroom performance or teacher recommendations 
for promotion.  Schools and school districts with a high number of student failures faced 
financial sanctions or even state takeover.  In this dissertation study, I identify key actors 
and significant events that contributed to the development and implementation of the 
LEAP.  I also explore popular rationales that supported the LEAP as a valid assessment 
of student learning and policy of school accountability. Finally, I examine the 
implications of LEAP’s development and the lasting effects on Louisiana students and 
communities.  
Significance of the Study 
 Educational reform initiatives at the state level have predictive value for national 
educational policy.  The Texas accountability system is often regarded as the model for 
the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) that authorizes standardized curriculum and 
assessment programs in every state (Nelson, McGhee, Meno, & Slater, 2007).  In early 
2010, the Florida state legislature passed a landmark bill to eliminate tenure for all 
beginning teachers and align teacher pay to student performance on standardized tests 
(Hafenbrack & Postal, 2010).  Although Florida’s governor vetoed the merit pay bill 
under intense pressure from educators, national support for merit pay escalated as a result 
of the political debate in Florida. Using merit pay to evaluate teacher performance and 
salary was later made a criterion for the 2010 Race to the Top federal grant program, 
which awarded $4 billion dollars to school districts and states throughout the country 
(U.S. Department of Education, 2011).  Much is known about Texas and Florida’s school 
accountability programs and their potential to impact national education policy, but little 
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has been researched on local educational initiatives in Louisiana. 
 In 2001, Louisiana became the first state to deny student promotion at the fourth 
and eighth grade level, and to deny a high school diploma, to those students who failed 
the LEAP 21/GEE state assessment (Johnson & Johnson, 2006).  Louisiana also imposed 
financial sanctions on low-performing schools and school districts as a part of LEAP 21.  
In 2004 the nationally-recognized educator magazine, Education Week, awarded 
Louisiana its top rating for standards and accountability and distinguished Louisiana’s 
accountability-via-assessment policy as an example for others to follow (Skinner, 2004).  
In 2005, citing a history of poor LEAP test scores, the Louisiana Legislature voted to 
terminate all employees in the New Orleans Parish Schools (NOPS) system following 
Hurricane Katrina.  Legislators created a hybrid school district in New Orleans consisting 
of traditional and charter schools operated by two different school boards: The Orleans 
Parish School Board (OPSB) operates about 12 mostly high performing schools in the 
city, and the Recovery School District (RSD) operates about 107 mostly low-performing 
schools in the city.  Charter schools outnumber traditional schools in a ratio of 3:1 in both 
districts, and charter schools are managed by a hodgepodge of private companies, private 
individuals, and educational management organizations (EMOs).  On its website the RSD 
states that it promotes “a system of autonomous school districts that are held 
accountable” and “business practices to ensure effectiveness and high standards” in 
fulfilling the mission for student improvement in struggling schools (Louisiana 
Department of Education “The Recovery School District, About the RSD,” 2008).   The 
hybridization of school districts in governance and operational structure found in New 
Orleans (i.e. local vs. state, traditional vs. charter, public vs. private) is a novel idea and 
5 
 
Louisiana is poised to lead the nation in redefining the operational control of public 
schools and the role of local communities within it.   
 Serious implications arise from using the LEAP to determine student promotion 
and graduation, school financing and school quality, and now with the RSD, school 
operations and governance.  It is essential to identify how and why school accountability-
via-assessment was adopted in Louisiana to determine the impact of the LEAP in 
improving teaching and student learning.  An informed understanding of the historical 
foundations and rationales used to implement the LEAP contextualizes its relative 
success or failure in contemporary discourse on school reform.  Before Louisiana 
accountability policies can be replicated in other areas around the country, the LEAP 
deserves critical historical analysis as a model of student assessment and policy of school 
accountability.  
 
Conceptual Framework 
 Historical research is anchored by the collection and evaluation of primary source 
data to formulate historical accounts of the past.  It relies on the authenticity of primary 
documents to draw inferences and interpretations based on patterns or relationships in 
history.  Historical researchers “subordinate historical facts to an interpretive framework 
within which those facts are given meaning and significance” (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2005, 
p. 413).  The procedures for conducting historical research are similar to other types of 
research paradigms: identify a topic or problem, formulate research questions, collect 
data, interpret data, and produce a verbal synthesis of the findings or interpretations (Gay 
& Airasian, 2000, p. 226).  Garrahan (1946) attaches precision to primary source data 
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collection by identifying six levels of inquiry: date, localization, authorship, analysis, 
integrity, and credibility.  The levels of inquiry constitute external criticism that 
eliminates the use of false evidence in historical analysis (Shafer, 1974).  They also help 
to establish authenticity of collected data.  Gay & Airasian (2000) offer four factors in 
considering the accuracy of primary documents, or internal criticism. First, the author of 
the document should be determined as a competent person knowledgeable about the 
event or occurrence under review.  Second, the time delay should be noted in evaluating 
each data source.  An observation or field notes written while the event is occurring 
(school board meeting minutes) or shortly after (diaries) are more likely to be accurate 
than recollections of those events many years later.  Third, the bias and motives of the 
author should be considered in establishing the aims, audience, and purpose of the 
document.  Finally, each piece of evidence should be compared with all others to 
determine the degree of agreement or validation (p. 229-230).  In synthesizing historical 
evidence, the concluding hypothesis must have greater explanatory power for the nature 
or course of facts than any competing explanation (McCullagh, 1984).  
 Historical research is used to construct a perspective from the historical record 
that advances or clarifies our understanding of historical foundations and current events.  
Primary source collection and interpretation is the core of historical research method 
(Grigg, 1991).  A conceptual framework of historical research informs this study by 
establishing the basis for data collection and analysis.  Because the goal of this study is to 
determine the foundations of the LEAP, conclusions are derived from the interplay of 
historical interpretation and the context of primary source data collected from archival 
records and oral history interviews.  A historical perspective of the LEAP is made from 
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primary source data analysis in both textual and non-textual forms.  
Methodology 
 Historical research method is the systematic collection and evaluation of data 
related to past occurrences in order to determine trends, causes, or effects of these events 
(Gay, 1996; Lucey, 1984).  Methods used in this study include document analysis and 
oral history interviews.  Document analysis involves collecting and analyzing primary 
source data.  Data are then evaluated as a credible source and used to draw inferences or 
assumptions directed toward the historian’s ends (Berkhofer, 2008).  Objects are 
collected and classified into three data categories: physical material versus textual, 
written versus other media (film, sound), and personal versus institutional (p. 6-8).  
Documents are identified as credible sources by evaluating the relationship between the 
source and original activity in the arrangement and preservation of materials (Grigg, 
1991, p. 233).  Primary source data, whether it is a testimony, photograph, or government 
report, is examined through sourcing, inference, and interpretation.  Multiple perspectives 
of historical events are acknowledged; first-hand accounts are produced with a particular 
aim and audience in view (McCullough & Richardson, 2000).  Document analysis 
answers specific research questions that involve foundations, patterns, and descriptions of 
historical events and figures. 
 Oral history interviews complement document analysis as another method for 
obtaining primary source data (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2005).  Oral history is used to 
supplement, not replace, the documentary record.  Oral history is recorded as social 
history and measures the impact of larger political and economic events on local 
communities and cultures (Sharpless, 2008).  Shafer (1974) advanced criteria for 
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evaluating eyewitness testimony in oral history interviews.  He emphasized the 
distinction between real and literal meaning of an author’s statements as well as the 
credibility and contradictions of an author’s words.  Standardized, open-ended interviews 
help to minimize interviewer effects, establish systematic questions for data analysis, and 
emphasize focused responses to research questions (Patton, 1990).  Interviews are 
reviewed a second time using categories developed by the researcher.  Oral history 
interviews provide a rich illustration of the historical record that complements document 
analysis.  They serve to recount historical events, provide testimony, explain behavior, 
and establish multiple or contrary perspectives for a historical event.   
Data Sources and Data Collection Methods 
 In determining the historical and legislative roots of the LEAP, I collected an 
extensive range of data sources.  Data sources include official reports from the Louisiana 
Department of Education, the State Superintendent of Schools, Louisiana State 
Legislature, and Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE); 
press releases and minutes from local school board meetings and town hall meetings; and 
various court briefings.  Academic literature, newspaper journalism, television scripts, 
and other media reports are used to supplement government and policy reports.  
Published accounts of the LEAP authored by teachers, parents, students, administrators, 
policy analysts, and journalists are also examined.   
 The oral history interviews reveal first-hand accounts from past students and 
teachers who were present in Louisiana schools as the LEAP was announced and 
implemented.  Participants were active in the LEAP debates, witnessed its 
implementation in local schools, and are knowledgeable of its effects on teaching and 
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learning. Participants were chosen from a list of teachers and students who emerged as 
important actors from the LEAP archival data.  The list was narrowed by eliminating 
deceased individuals, individuals who lacked requisite mental faculties, persons who 
declined to take part in the study, and those whose correspondence information could not 
be located.   A total of six (6) participants were interviewed using Skype video calling or 
via the telephone.  Each participant was interviewed singularly using a standardized, 
open-ended form.  Interview transcripts were transcribed and arranged for data analysis. 
Data Analysis 
 First, I collected and arranged archival data into three data categories: physical 
material versus textual, written versus other media (film and sound), and personal versus 
institutional. Second, I evaluated data to infer the authenticity of each document, the 
packaging and location of the document’s source, and the context or perspective of the 
document’s source. To perform document analysis, I drew from Garrahan’s (1946) six 
levels of inquiry that constitute external criticism. I began by certifying the date, 
localization, author, and credibility of each document by collecting the documents from 
official depositories of the document’s source. For example, biographies of Louisiana 
state senators were received from the archives of the Louisiana Senate, and LEAP test 
scores for urban school districts were obtained from press releases of the Louisiana 
Department of Education.  I confirmed the integrity of the document by researching the 
authorship and relationship to the source. The author’s relationship to the source indicates 
the legitimacy of the author as a competent person knowledgeable about the information 
provided in the document.  For example, a summary of Louisiana’s Competency-Based 
Act was obtained by the Official Journal of the State and certified in records belonging to 
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the official archives of the Louisiana State Congress. To analyze documents from 
secondary sources such as The Times Picayune newspaper, I separated editorial opinions 
from official reporting on topics such as test scores and election results. Within this 
dissertation, I identified newspaper articles as editorial opinions, interviews, or test scores 
released by state education officials. 
 Since my research topic involves a historical event that occurred over three 
decades earlier, it is important to outline the data analysis for oral history interviews. To 
establish internal criticism, I relied on Gay & Airasian’s (2000) model for establishing 
accuracy of primary source information.  There is significant time delay between the 
1986 creation of the LEAP and the interviews I conducted in 2010.  Because of the time 
delay, I carefully selected interview participants that were both competent and 
knowledgeable about events associated with the LEAP. I narrowed interview data to the 
information that directly illustrated important events in the historical record I uncovered 
from archival sources. I then compared interview responses included in this dissertation 
with all other evidence to determine the degree of validation. I analyzed both the 
interview and archival data to establish historical patterns, establish congruence in the 
historical record, and obtain verification. Finally, data was arranged so that a historical 
account emerges with explanatory power to illustrate a broad conception of the research 
focus guiding the study. 
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Definition of Terms 
Educational policy: a mandate created by a legislative or institutional body that involves 
schooling and education 
Excellence rationale: a theory of school improvement that promotes a universal standard 
of academic excellence in all schools regardless of socioeconomic status 
High stakes testing: used interchangeably with high stakes assessments; refers to state-
administered student assessment programs that establish punitive consequences for low 
student performance on standardized assessments 
Louisiana State Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE): an 
administrative, policymaking body for elementary and secondary schools in Louisiana; 
BESE supervises school operations and management of public schools in Louisiana 
Minimum Foundation Formula: The financing formula set by BESE to determine the 
annual costs of school financing in Louisiana; Louisiana Legislature approves the amount 
of the Minimum Foundation Program annually and BESE appropriates school funding 
accordingly  
School accountability: an educational agenda that requires students, parents, teachers, 
school and district leaders to accept responsibility for student achievement on 
standardized tests through incentives and sanctions 
Standards-based reform: an educational agenda that promotes standardized curriculum 
and assessments in local schools to raise academic performance on national and 
international achievement tests 
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Organization of Chapters 
 The remainder of this dissertation includes four subsequent chapters.  In chapter 
two, I review the State Supervisory Program as Louisiana’s first standardized curriculum 
and assessment program.  The Louisiana Department of Education established the State 
Supervisory Program in 1921 to promote Anglo-American language and culture 
throughout the state.  Student achievement testing, though limited to certain schools, was 
an important feature of the State Supervisory Program and tied Louisiana to the national 
testing movement that gained footing in the early 20th century.  In chapter three, I 
examine the political and social foundations of high stakes testing in Louisiana and the 
excellence rationale that emerged as the founding principles of the LEAP.  Together, 
chapters two and three provide a chronological overview of educational testing in 
Louisiana through state policy action, and serves to contextualize the story of LEAP 
within a larger framework of national and state testing practices.  In chapter four, I detail 
the actions of local political and school leaders to establish the LEAP as a high stakes 
testing program.  I also review legal challenges to the LEAP graduate exit exam (GEE) 
and the dual system of high school graduation requirements that resulted.  Key architects 
of Louisiana’s accountability system are introduced—former Governor Mike Foster, 
former Superintendent Cecil Picard, former BESE member-turned Superintendent Paul 
Pastorek, and former BESE member Leslie Jacobs.  These political leaders spearheaded 
the LEAP for the 21st century Program (LEAP 21) that instituted both rigorous 
assessments and stringent accountability policies that define the LEAP program in 
present-day Louisiana.  I conclude this historical analysis of the LEAP in chapter five by 
examining the implications of this high stakes testing policy in Louisiana.                     
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             CHAPTER 2 
 
THE STATE SUPERVISORY PROGRAM: HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
STANDARDIZED CURRICULUM AND ASSESSMENT IN LOUISIANA   
 
 In the previous chapter, the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) 
is introduced as a critical high stakes testing policy that warrants meaningful historical 
analysis. In this chapter I examine the Louisiana State Supervisory Program as an 
antecedent of high stakes testing and the LEAP.  In the early 1920s, state leaders 
developed the Supervisory Program as an educational policy to promote cultural 
assimilation of Louisiana’s heterogeneous population.  The State Supervisory Program 
emphasized Anglo-American cultural norms through standardized curriculum and 
assessment applied unevenly in racially segregated schools. I also situate Louisiana’s 
State Supervisory Program within the larger national testing movement in the early 20th 
century.  Louisiana’s assessment policy differed somewhat from the national testing 
movement in terms of its scope, but rationales for the systematic use of standardized 
testing in public schools were similar. The national testing movement was advanced by 
educational psychologists and grew in popularity because of three reasons: 
hereditarianism, scientific experimentation, and social efficiency.  Louisiana educational 
leaders embraced the State Supervisory Program for those same reasons, but fundamental 
values toward public education made Louisiana’s testing program distinct.  Louisiana’s 
deep roots in French colonialism, Catholicism, and slavery, greatly influenced the scope 
of its State Supervisory Program and the unique educational structure that resulted.   
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Public Education in Louisiana 
 Public education in Louisiana has an interesting background story that began in 
the early 1800s with its first governor, William C. Claiborne (Hebert, 1999; Noble, 
1999). When Claiborne arrived in Louisiana shortly after the transfer of the Louisiana 
Purchase, he found a polyglot population of French, African, Native American, and 
Spanish blends who were somewhat united in their disdain for the imposed English 
government. Schooling followed the traditional French model of private boarding 
schools, tutors, and apprenticeships for wealthy and upper-class families, with no 
provisions for the common masses. By law it was illegal to teach slaves to read or write, 
and thus about two-thirds of the population were forcibly illiterate. The free Black 
community received schooling from Catholic institutions and private schools, and their 
efforts established the largest literate Black community in the United States prior to the 
Civil War (Alberts, 1999).  Free Blacks often received education that was both practical 
and political; education was secured for the collective advancement of Blacks both 
politically and economically (Mitchell, 2000).  Small bands of Native Americans also 
received some religious and literacy instruction through Catholic monasteries that began 
under Spanish rule in Louisiana (Noble, 1999).  
 For Governor Claiborne, however, public schooling was the key agent to the 
Americanization of Louisiana. He was aware of the desperate need to “educate, 
indoctrinate, and Americanize a largely foreign, partly hostile population” (Suarez, 1999, 
p. 65).  He pursued public education as a way to homogenize Louisiana’s eclecticism 
under the auspices of American language and culture.  He sought legislation for the 
provision of public education through general taxation but he was unable to secure the 
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support of the powerful Creole elite, whose youth were educated in private Catholic 
schools.  Discontent soon arose over school financing and the cultural imposition of 
Protestantism and the English language. As a result, the movement for public education 
languished until 1847 when the Anglo-Saxon population began to outnumber the Creole 
population.  In 1847 the state legislature passed the first statewide public school law, 
which supported the establishment of public schools through general taxation (Hilton, 
Shipp, & Gremillion, 1999). Unfortunately, the fledgling school system did not gather 
much traction until 1877. The years 1847-1877 were marked by continual disruption 
from the Civil War and Reconstruction, when public schools were abandoned due to 
financial despair and the absence of educational leadership at the state and local level. 
Newly freed Blacks eagerly attended the schools of the Freedmen‘s Bureau during 
Reconstruction, but White resentment toward Northern control and integrated facilities 
led to a White boycott (p. 144).  
 Following Reconstruction, Louisiana schools obtained substantial support through 
state legislative action and local taxation (Hilton, Shipp, & Gremillion, 1999). The 
General School Act of 1877 and the Constitution of 1898 provided for the Louisiana 
Department of Education and Louisiana Superintendent of Schools.  Soon after, steps 
were taken to centralize Louisiana school leadership under the parish and state leaders--as 
opposed to local authorities in towns and cities--in the General School Acts of 1912 and 
1916. Together, these legislative acts authorized the Louisiana Department of Education 
to maintain the general supervision of school operations and financial appropriations. 
However, a particular emphasis of the Louisiana Department of Education was in 
creating uniform standards for curriculum, graduation, and student assessment.  
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Standardizing Curriculum and Instruction 
 Similar to other states in the Deep South, White Louisiana residents maintained 
deep-seated beliefs of White supremacy and Black subservience well after the federal 
constitutional ban on slavery. These beliefs resonated sharply within the educational 
system and were a central factor in the dual system of racially segregated schools that 
later emerged. The earliest activities of the Louisiana Department of Education 
(henceforth called the LDE) included consolidating local control, establishing institutes 
for teacher training, supervising instruction and curriculum development, and certifying 
high school diplomas (Alexander, 1940; Ives, 1999). Teacher training institutes began in 
the mid-1880s under direction of the Peabody Board. In 1899, then-State Superintendent 
Joseph A. Breaux “decried the lack of uniformity in the whole educational movement” 
and sought to manage teacher training and certification (Alexander, 1940, p. 10). State 
legislators soon gave authority to the LDE to conduct one-week summer training 
institutes for White teachers on a voluntary basis (although, teachers who did not attend 
forfeited one day’s pay). The training institutes followed a prescribed schedule of 
instruction that targeted subject matter and methods. The institutes also imposed a list of 
basic ideas that emphasized the practical nature of schooling and the role of education in 
increasing “efficiency in all of the activities of life” (p. 17).  
 The LDE consolidated local control by merging White one-room schools into 
single parish schools and placing the appointment of parish school supervisors under their 
authority (Alexander, 1940; Rogers, 1936). The parish supervisor’s role was to oversee 
instruction within the parish schools and evaluate whether certain standards were met in 
the elementary, junior high, and high school classrooms. In doing so, there was some 
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semblance of curriculum sequencing that provided for seamless transition between grade 
levels. The parish supervisors often created evaluation guides that were distributed to 
teachers in advance of classroom visits. For example, in 1923 the high school supervisor 
distributed a chart of nine teaching techniques in an attempt to promote their standard use 
in high schools (Alexander, 1940, p. 49). According to the 1929 manual, Louisiana High 
School Standards, Organization, and Administration, principals were urged to make no 
changes in the subjects offered or curriculum sequence (p. 51). The course of study for 
the high school included an emphasis on practical and agricultural courses alongside 
studies in English, American and Louisiana history. 
 Keeping in line with the fervor to develop uniform curricula and sequencing in 
the White system of schooling, great care was made to develop a standard course of study 
for Black schools. Black education was viewed suspiciously by many White Louisiana 
residents, especially White planters who relied on Black sharecropping labor to finance 
local economies. Only through public campaigns by John D. Rockefeller’s General 
Education Board and the LDE to reassure White communities about the “special” 
curriculum for Blacks, did White attitudes change. In a 1918 bulletin entitled, “Aims and 
Needs of the Negro Public Education in Louisiana,” the LDE stated the curriculum for 
Blacks would teach students how to perform duties “the world wants done” (Chujo, 1999, 
p. 310). Curriculum in both the elementary and secondary schools stressed agriculture, 
home economics, and limited literacy instruction.  For Black elementary students, school 
terms were shortened to correspond with the planting season. The first four terms offered 
basic literacy instruction, the following four terms concentrated on American and 
Louisiana history, geography, and hygiene, and the last two terms focused on industrial 
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arts such as cooking and canning. Curriculum at the high school level almost exclusively 
stressed general and industrial education. The first two years offered courses on English 
language, American and Louisiana history, and industrial science. The last two years 
offered courses in manual trades and teacher training. Of the high school courses, a Black 
teacher in Caddo Parish concluded: “They want us to teach the children such things as 
shoe shining, waiting tables and….maid service” (as quoted in Johnson, 1997, p. 149). 
 Louisiana had the distinction of being the only state in the county to differentiate 
a separate, yet standardized curriculum exclusively for Blacks (Chujo, 1999, p. 310).  A 
dual system of racially segregated schools maintained the color line entrenched during 
Louisiana’s colonial years, and the curricular emphasis on English language, history, and 
culture reflects the continuous attempt to Americanize Louisiana’s diverse population.  
However, the concern for standardization, industrial education, and practical living tied 
Louisiana to the larger Industrial Revolution dominating the nation.  The State 
Supervisory Program embraced Industrial-era values but maintained Louisiana’s 
traditional views on race, schooling and society reflected in its colonial history. 
 
The State Supervisory Program (1920-1934) 
 Legendary state school superintendent, T.H. Harris, who served from 1908 -1940, 
is credited for the high degree of centralization in the Louisiana school system (Rogers, 
1936). Even more influential than legislative action, Harris sought a strong state 
educational system and enlisted the cooperation of business, political, and professional 
groups to achieve that goal.  For Harris, the most important function of the state 
department was classroom supervision (Alexander, 1940, p. 49) and he began the State 
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Supervisory Program as a comprehensive program to promote uniform standards in 
curriculum, instruction, and assessment. State testing was initiated by the high school 
supervisor as early as 1910, who prepared mid-semester tests in the state office and 
forwarded them to principals, who in turn were required to issue and report test results (p. 
52).  In 1917 the first standardized achievement tests, Ayres Spelling Scale, was 
administered by Mr. John Foote, assistant to T.H. Harris (Rogers, 1936, p. 26). By the 
1920s, an ambitious plan for statewide testing in core subjects for all students was 
included as a function of the Supervisory Program. 
 A state testing program was popularized as early as 1916 and was implemented in 
the 1920-1921 school year (Rogers, 1936). A summary of the Supervisory Program for 
the 1920-1921 school year indicates that parish supervisors administered commercial 
standardized achievement tests in arithmetic, reading, and spelling “to measure the 
efficiency of teaching” (p. 30).  In 1922 the state education department created its own 
statewide test for seventh-graders to assess student achievement, and by the 1929-1930 
school year the state education department began preparing statewide benchmark tests in 
arithmetic every six weeks for grades two to seven (p. 33). In subsequent years, the 
statewide testing program was expanded so that a benchmark test for each subject was 
prepared for each grade (Alexander, 1940, p. 52). Benchmark tests were aligned to the 
standards set by the Louisiana Department of Education for approved elementary and 
secondary schools. Curriculum guides were provided for content and sequencing in each 
six-week period for reading, writing, and arithmetic. Participation in the statewide testing 
program was voluntary, but department officials actively sought school participation and 
test results were tabulated and announced by state department workers (Alexander, 1940, 
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p. 52).  The tests were used to assess and monitor student achievement of curriculum 
standards set by the Louisiana Department of Education, but did not impact student 
promotion, school operations, or school funding.  Subjects were tested randomly each 
six-week period, and schools were not apprised which subjects would be tested.  In doing 
so, the Louisiana Department of Education sought to enforce its curriculum 
recommendations for scope and sequence: 
The first grade will not be given a test during the first six weeks. After that a test 
in reading will be given after the course of each six-week period. In other grades, 
a test will be prepared in one subject each period. No announcement will be made 
as to what subject or subjects will be selected for the test in any period. Each test 
will be based on the textbooks of the latest adoption and the limits of the test will 
be confined to subject matter outlined for the six-week period. (Rogers, 1936, p. 
52)  
Not all of the test scores received would be included in the official test averages for 
Louisiana. The Louisiana Department of Education made determinations about which 
schools would be included in the state average and those that would be excluded, but no 
criteria are listed about how department supervisors made their decisions.  Also, scores 
were not distributed statewide nor available for comparison and ranking; parishes could 
only obtain copies of their students’ test scores (Alexander, 1940; Rogers, 1936). 
 The centralization and uniformity of Louisiana public schools had been achieved 
through the efforts of the Louisiana Department of Education by 1930.  The department 
approved a set of standards for both the elementary and secondary level and certified 
graduates from schools that adhered to the set standards.  Parish and local supervisors 
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enforced uniform standards in curriculum, teaching, and assessment through the use of 
standard evaluations, teaching guides, and assessments. The statewide testing program, 
however, was later abandoned by the Louisiana Department of Education as an integral 
feature of its Supervisory Program. Statewide testing in the high school was discontinued 
in 1933 and later ended in the elementary schools in 1934.  Reports from the State 
Superintendent attributed the discontinuation of the testing program to a lack of state 
funding, but Rogers (1936) speculated that the exact checking of curriculum progress was 
also a factor.  Alexander (1940) suggested that the standards and accompanying tests 
were too narrow and definite, and needed to be developed in cooperation with teachers 
and students.  There is some indication that the department officials also thought the 
standards were too rigid.  Standards applied in approving elementary schools in the 1938-
1939 school term emphasized a flexible curriculum study under general 
recommendations for each grade level. Specifying attainments of academic achievement 
through tests and evaluation was made secondary to curriculum study and instructional 
development in schools. The Louisiana Department of Education did not abandon its 
efforts to engender homogenous and uniform courses of study.  Rather, instead of 
administering a statewide testing program to assess student achievement of prescribed 
curricula, the department shifted its focus to curriculum development in setting standards, 
furnishing curriculum materials, teacher training, and direct classroom supervision. At 
the close of the 1930s, Alexander (1940) described the state education department as 
directive, or one that provided for the “comprehensive curriculum planning and 
development involving almost universal organized study” (p. 112). Ives (1999) 
concurred, crediting Louisiana’s centralized school system to heavy state financing and 
22 
 
state legislative action.  He concluded his examination of educational leadership in 
Louisiana by stating: “Who pays the fiddler calls the tune” (p. 250). 
 The State Supervisory Program demonstrates a founding principle of strong state 
leadership in the promotion of standardized curriculum and assessment.  It also illustrates 
curriculum differentiation along racial lines, which limited Black schools to only 
rudimentary literacy and industrial education.  A major reason for this distinction was the 
state’s dependence on Black sharecropping labor to support the traditional agricultural 
economy.  Standardized curriculum and assessment policies institutionalized unequal 
curriculum tracts between Blacks and Whites, which extended to school financing and 
facilities as well. In doing so, Black educational achievements lagged sharply behind 
Whites and served to perpetuate stereotypes of White intellectual superiority.  
Louisiana’s achievement tests were used to promote assimilation and homogeneity as 
summative assessments, but nationally, standardized tests were used as diagnostic tools 
to place students into differentiated curriculum tracts.  The national testing movement 
championed Industrial-era values for technology and efficiency to manage public 
schools, and to distinguish college-bound students from the factory labor force. 
 
The National Testing Movement and Louisiana 
 The origins of both intelligence and standardized achievement testing in 
American schools can be traced to the scientific discoveries of early 20th century 
European psychologists (Galton, 1869; Binet & Simon, 1916; Stern, 1990).  American 
educational psychologists imported standardization design and test development from 
Europe, and refined intelligence and achievement testing for mass production in 
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American schools.  Boring (1950) described the American branch of psychology as one 
which inherited its “physical body from German experimentalism and its mind from 
Darwin” (p. 506). In particular, it was the combining of statistical measurement with the 
genetic approach to human nature that defined American educational psychology in both 
theory and practice during this period.  Leaders of American educational psychology—
Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman, Edward Thordike, and Robert Yerkes—all subscribed to 
hereditarianism or the belief in social Darwinism.  Hereditarianism espoused to a 
racialized hierarchy of mental ability to explain social and racial inequities.  These 
hereditarian views greatly influenced standardized testing designs and their 
implementation.  Standardization required statistical tools often found in the realm of 
natural sciences, which granted intelligence and achievement testing a degree of validity 
and credibility within society. 
 Henry Goddard, an American eugenicist who completed his training in Europe, 
administered the first standardized intelligence tests in America in 1913 (Goddard, 1917).  
He tested newly arrived immigrants at Ellis Island, and identified nearly 80 percent of 
Jewish, Italian, Russian, and Hungarians as mentally retarded.  His Ellis Island study 
substantiated eugenicists’ cause for deportations and restrictions in federal immigration 
policy (Gould, 1981).  Lewis Terman, who personified the concept of biological 
determinism, revised the 1911 intelligence scale developed by French-born Alfred Binet 
and Theodore Simon in 1916 (Terman, 1916).  Terman modified the Binet-Simon scale 
by adding tests on English vocabulary and fables.  He standardized the Binet-Simon scale 
using a sample of White, middle-class children in the Stanford University community to 
develop norms. Native Americans, Mexicans, and African-Americans were excluded 
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from the standardization sample. Terman developed the Stanford-Binet intelligence test 
based on his revisions to the Binet scale and results of his standardization sample. Used 
as the model for subsequent intelligence tests in the United States (Gould, 1981; Valencia 
& Suzuki, 2001), the Stanford-Binet tests were replicated in numerous studies and 
continually reported the genetic, mental superiority of Anglo-Europeans (e.g., Garth, 
1925; Goodenough, 1926; Shuey, 1958).  
 Edward Thorndike completed some of the earliest work in standardized 
achievement testing (Raftery, 1988). Thorndike’s specialty was the application of 
quantitative methodology to the field of learning theory.  He sought to eliminate 
subjectivity and variability in the assessment of student achievement by designing a 
series of achievement tests standardized for teacher administration. The arithmetic test 
was introduced in 1908 and later joined by spelling (1910), handwriting and drawing 
(1913), reading (1914), and language ability (1916) (Raftery, 1988). Thorndike 
developed teacher word lists, dictionaries, and other instructional materials to assist 
teachers in improving student performance on the achievement tests. By the close of 
1916, a host of standardized achievement tests had been developed and commercially 
marketed to schools and school systems (Gray, 1916).  Not all of the early achievement 
tests were norm-referenced, but they usually involved standard procedures of 
administration and scoring.  
 During World War I, Henry Goddard, Lewis Terman, Edward Thorndike, and 
Robert Yerkes collaborated to create a series of intelligence tests for the United States 
Army. The army tests were the first mass-produced written tests of intelligence and were 
used to classify military placement. Terman, Thorndike, and Yerkes later developed the 
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National Intelligence Test (NIT) in 1920 based on their revisions to the army intelligence 
tests. Using similar techniques of norming and standardization (the NIT was also 
standardized using a sample of Whites only), the NIT was designed to identify 
intellectual capacity in schoolchildren as early as the first grade. Terman campaigned for 
mass intelligence testing in school systems as a mechanism for classifying students into 
differentiated curriculum tracks. For Terman, mass intelligence testing increased school 
efficiency because curriculum placement would be determined according to native ability 
(Terman, 1916).  
 Terman’s graduate students led the first system-wide adoption of intelligence 
testing and curriculum differentiation in Oakland, California in 1919 (Valencia & Suzuki, 
2001). From Oakland, intelligence testing and curriculum differentiation extended to 
other school systems around the country. In 1926, the U.S. Department of the Interior 
surveyed the use of group intelligence tests and ability grouping at the elementary, junior 
high, and high schools levels. Drawing from data in 292 cities, it was reported that 85% 
of elementary schools, 70% of junior high schools, and 49% of high schools used 
intelligence tests to classify students into homogenous ability groups (as cited in Gould, 
1981). By the 1950s, intelligence and achievement testing became institutionalized in 
American schools, and in many cases they were a central factor in curriculum placement, 
promotion, and graduation as found in Los Angeles (Raftery, 1988), Detroit (Angus & 
Mirel, 1993), and Santa Fe (Mondale & Patton, 2001). 
 Nationally, intelligence and achievement tests were used to aid curriculum 
placement and differentiation.  Major cities faced rapidly growing, ethnically diverse 
student populations that contrasted sharply to the demographics of older and established 
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private schools.  The tests allowed school officials to place students in homogenous 
ability groups that aligned to their educability as indicated by intelligence and 
achievement test scores. In Louisiana, race was the distinguishing factor in curriculum 
study rather than standardized test scores.  However, leading rationales for the systematic 
use of testing both nationally and in Louisiana were the same.  The three reasons for 
systematic use of intelligence and achievement testing were hereditarianism, scientific 
experimentation, and social efficiency.  Hereditarianism resonated sharply with 
commonly-held beliefs in Louisiana because it espoused to the supremacy of Anglo-
American language, history, and culture.  Early intelligence and achievement tests were 
standardized using norms developed from an almost exclusively all-White, middle-class 
sample population (Price, 1934).  The tests were heavily marked by language ability, 
vocabulary, and behaviors established by the test developer and considered “normal” for 
the sample. Testing results repeatedly revealed the superiority of American-born Whites 
over foreigners and racial minorities, which fit neatly with Louisiana values for racially 
segregated schools and Anglo-American language and culture.   
 Also, the technological savvy inherent to standardized tests afforded them a 
degree of legitimacy both nationally and in Louisiana. For the founder-psychologists, the 
integration of statistical methods was vital to the level of rigor needed to advance 
educational testing in the mainstream. According to Goodenough (1950), Thorndike 
popularized his work in standardized achievement tests as a rigorous application of 
quantitative methods. Yerkes also “equated rigor and science with numbers and 
quantification,” and believed intelligence testing would propel psychology as an 
established science “worthy of financial and institutional support” (Gould, 1981, p. 223).  
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In an advertisement for the National Intelligence Tests reprinted by Gould (1981), the 
tests were promoted to have undergone “careful analysis by a statistical staff” (p. 208).  
The posting also stated that the tests were “simple in application, reliable, and 
immediately useful for classifying children in Grades 3 to 8 with respect to intellectual 
ability” (p. 208). The psychologists gained legitimacy for intelligence and achievement 
testing as an extension of quantitative methodology already found in the natural sciences 
and well-established as scientific rigor. The promotion of statistical methods within test 
construction and development served as a popular rationale for the system-wide 
implementation of intelligence and achievement testing in American schools. Test scores 
carried a degree of certitude and public confidence that seemingly assured policymakers 
and school leaders of trustworthy results.   
 Perhaps the strongest rationale for the large-scale implementation of intelligence 
and achievement testing in schools was that the tests served to increase social efficiency. 
Kliebard (2004) succinctly describes the social efficiency ideal in the early twentieth 
century not only as an educational doctrine, but a societal urgency. Social efficiency 
reformers sought radical changes in school policy to meet direct social and economic 
needs of society. They argued that a classical liberal education lacked direct utility for 
large and diverse student populations.  Instead, practical and vocational education was 
necessary to safeguard American identity and institutions from rapid urbanization and 
immigration. Advanced by sociologists John Franklin Bobbitt (1912) and David Snedden 
(1919), social efficiency leaders sought to integrate schools more closely within the 
fabric of existing and desired social structures.  The first mass-produced intelligence tests 
created by Terman, Thorndike, and Yerkes for the United States army were premised on 
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a “particular conception of the good society and a particular attitude toward the nature of 
intelligence” (Spring, 1972, p. 13).  The measurement of intelligence was based upon 
psychologists’ conception of the good society and the good man (p. 13).  Intelligence 
tests gained acceptance as a vehicle for curriculum differentiation that prepared students 
for their anticipated social roles.  In general, the American populace began to see more 
value in functional, social education that reduced costs and increased utility.  Louisiana 
state leaders also valued functional education through their early policies of curriculum 
and assessment. The strong emphasis on industrial arts and domestic service signals 
intent to prepare students for unskilled labor in Louisiana’s agricultural, manufacturing, 
and service industries. The crux of Louisiana’s State Supervisory program was social 
education, for the program targeted the socializing force of public schools to advance 
Anglo-American social norms and to establish an industrial labor force.  
 Nationwide, intelligence and achievement testing gained footing because the tests 
exemplified popular values of the Industrial era—hereditarianism, scientific technology, 
and social efficiency.  However, criticism of hereditarianism and high costs threatened 
educational testing following the Great Depression. In Louisiana, high costs contributed 
to the dissolution of the State Supervisory Program, but the tests’ strict adherence to 
Anglo-American language and cultural norms were also a factor in its discontinuation.  
Louisiana’s large Catholic communities rebelled against standardized curriculum and 
assessment as an encroachment of Protestantism.  Catholic schools enjoyed a long history 
in Louisiana as one of the surviving legacies of the French colonial period, and public 
schools competed against private and Catholic schools that were preferred by Louisiana 
Creoles.  Nationwide, hereditarianism and the deference to Anglo-American language 
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and culture drew critics to intelligence and achievement testing.  Bond (1924) analyzed 
intelligence test data of White males and found a strong correlation between school 
achievement and test scores, debunking intelligence tests as a measure of genetic ability. 
Price (1934) examined the limitations of using a singular race, socio-economic group, 
and geographical location to establish norms used in intelligence tests, and questioned 
how Blacks’ intelligence could be accurately measured when they were excluded from 
the standardization sample. Sanchez (1934) challenged the validity of intelligence tests 
and determined that prejudices often influenced which students were selected for testing 
and how scores would be interpreted.  These minority scholars were joined by some 
White researchers, such as Boas (1943), whose investigations found the nature of 
intelligence to be “socially determined” (p. 164).   
 Especially damaging to hereditarianism was the retraction on genetic intelligence 
made by Terman, Goddard, and Brigham.  According to Gould (1981), Goddard was first 
to recant in a 1928 article in the Journal of Psycho-Asthenics. He changed his position on 
the education of the “feeble-minded” by noting that many of these students were capable 
of learning and did not require segregated schooling. Terman acknowledged 
environmental factors as a condition of test score performance in the 1937 revision of the 
Stanford-Binet test (p. 221-222).  Eventually, court challenges surfaced to challenge the 
practice of educational testing in curriculum placements or ability-grouping. In Hobson v. 
Hansen (1967) plaintiffs first questioned the legality of educational testing as a school 
policy for deciding curricular assignments. Plaintiffs successfully argued that the tests 
were used to disproportionately place Black students in the lowest curriculum tracks. 
Hobson was followed by Diana (1970), Covarrubias (1971), and Guadalupe (1972), 
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which collectively challenged the overrepresentation of minority students in special 
education classes (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001). The combined criticism from court 
challenges, research and scholarship, and minority communities, contributed to policy 
challenges that reduced the mandatory practice of intelligence and achievement testing in 
curricular placements. Many school systems followed the lead from New York City 
Public Schools, which discontinued I.Q. testing as a means of classifying students in 
1964 (Valencia & Suzuki, 2001).  However, criticisms of intelligence and achievement 
testing could not prevent the growing use of these tests as an institutional practice among 
schools, colleges, and universities. The 1966 Coleman survey reported that ninety percent 
of the nation’s students were administered intelligence and/or achievement tests at both 
the elementary and secondary levels (Coleman, 1966).  The creation of the Educational 
Testing Service (ETS) in 1947 fostered systematic use of standardized testing in college 
admissions policies and a host of post-secondary institutions (Rein, 1974).  
 Louisiana officials revived their statewide student testing program during the 
desegregation era.  The tests became a critical component of Louisiana’s desegregation 
policy and were used to produce racially-segregated schools as a natural product of 
educational testing and ability-grouping. Eventually, intelligence and achievement tests 
became a central criterion for admissions to magnet schools and desegregated 
predominantly-White schools. Louisiana state officials also turned to a new form of 
achievement testing to uniformly assess all students and their academic achievement.  To 
address criticisms in standardization design, achievement tests were modified to reflect a 
criterion-referenced format that assessed student knowledge of basic or minimum skills. 
Minimum competency tests were favored during the desegregation period to measure 
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student learning of prescribed core curricula.  These tests were applauded as a way of 
promoting equity, but often lead to racial inequalities in student promotion and 
graduation. 
 
Summary 
 The State Supervisory Program established a strong precedent for standardized 
curriculum and assessment early in the history of Louisiana public education. The push 
for standardization tied Louisiana to the larger social efficiency movement of the 
Industrial era, but Louisiana state officials also saw achievement testing as a vehicle for 
cultural assimilation.  The legacy of the State Supervisory Program is a unique 
framework of public schooling that later shapes Louisiana high stakes testing policies.  
First, the State Supervisory Program embraced standardized curriculum and assessment 
as a way of promoting the supremacy of Anglo-American language, culture, and history.  
These standards were not totally accepted in Louisiana because of the deep connection to 
French colonialism and the system of Catholic schools that nurtured large Creole 
communities.  The French system of schooling survived as the model for the upper and 
middle classes, who continued to service private or Catholic schools to educate their 
children.  Thus, a dual system of schooling emerged along class lines where the upper 
and middle classes of both races predominantly attended nonpublic schools.  Another 
legacy of the State Supervisory Program is the racial inequalities that it promoted.  
Curriculum standards were differentiated according to race and usually limited Black 
education to only rudimentary learning.  Curriculum, funding, and facilities for Blacks 
were unequal to Whites, which led to unequal educational opportunities and attainment 
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between the races.  Following Brown, racially-segregated schools and the inequalities 
that resulted, became the impetus for reviving standardized curriculum and assessment 
first initiated under the State Supervisory Program.  School desegregation, a failed 
economy, and minimum-competency testing (MCT), were important social foundations 
of the LEAP that advanced a new excellence rationale for high stakes testing in 
Louisiana.   
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CHAPTER 3 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
HIGH STAKES TESTING IN LOUISIANA 
  
 
 From 1976 to 1986, Louisiana policymakers took aggressive action to reform 
public education through a policy framework of standards-based reform (SBR).  Within a 
single decade lawmakers introduced over a hundred education bills to centralize 
curriculum, assessment, and student promotion firmly under state control.  A 1985 
constitutional amendment established The Louisiana Quality Education Fund, one of the 
largest education trusts in the country, to finance these reform initiatives.  Such action 
was atypical for state leaders, who had not supported comprehensive school reform since 
the State Supervisory Program was disbanded in the 1930s.  Louisiana’s dependence on 
unskilled labor and its racially conservative political culture usually hindered state 
investment in public education (Elazar, 1984).  Prior to the desegregation era, Johnson 
(1942) described Louisiana schools as a “vicious circle” where government neglect 
created a cycle of poverty that forced many into low-skilled and menial labor.  The state’s 
large Black student population, who amounted to just under half of all public school 
students, particularly suffered from underfunding and exploitation (Anderson, 1988; 
Chujo, 1999).  Therefore, it is striking to note the aggressive efforts taken to develop the 
Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as the state’s first comprehensive 
high stakes testing program.  The LEAP is Louisiana’s model of standards-based reform, 
grounded in the core values of education conservatives post-desegregation: standards, 
assessments, and accountability.  
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 The LEAP began in 1986 as a program of standardized curriculum and 
assessments, but evolved into a weapon of school accountability under the revised LEAP 
for the 21st Century (LEAP 21) later implemented in 1999.  Its origins are permeated by 
a number of contextual factors that prompted state leaders to urgently reform public 
schools.  School desegregation, economic recession, low education rankings, and the 
national conservative movement influenced both legislative action and popular opinion in 
favor of the testing program.  This chapter will detail the social foundations of the LEAP 
program to contextualize the larger sociopolitical factors that drew Louisiana 
policymakers toward high stakes testing. 
 
School Desegregation  
White Flight and Re-segregation 
 The foundations of Louisiana’s high stakes testing program were laid in the social 
upheaval following Brown v. Board of Education (1954) and the court-ordered 
desegregation of New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS) in 1960.  Louisiana’s 
desegregation policy rested on the state’s 1960 pupil placement law (R.S. 17:101), which 
authorized pupil assignments on the basis of elaborate standardized testing requirements 
and residential proximity to the school (Baker, 1996; McCarrick, 1964; Wieder, 1987).  
Pupil placement laws “had become the preferred method of avoiding desegregation” for 
southern states by relying on ostensibly nonracial factors to assign students in 
desegregated school systems (Klarman, 2004, p. 330).  Louisiana’s pupil placement law 
carefully omitted race in its wording, and its premise claimed to promote “better 
education, peace, and good order” of the state (R.S. 17:101; Baker, 1996, p. 226).  Pupil 
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placement depended on residential proximity to the school, and because Louisiana’s 
housing patterns were usually racially segregated, a vast majority of public schools would 
remain segregated as well.   
 In large urban areas such as New Orleans and Baton Rouge, there was a higher 
concentration of Blacks living in close-knit communities alongside Whites.  Standardized 
testing requirements became essential to maintaining segregation in these urban school 
districts.  A 1960 report by Louisiana’s flagship newspaper, the Times Picayune, drew 
upon Blacks’ lower test scores on the Metropolitan Readiness Test to argue that 
differences in academic ability necessitated racially-segregated schools (Muller, 1976).  
But, by implementing the testing requirement for Black applicants, school leaders would 
ensure a quality education for all White students and minimize integration at the same 
time (Muller, 1976, p. 82).   Lloyd Rittiner, President of the Orleans Parish School Board 
in 1960 and member of the White Citizens Council, speculated that “not more than a 
dozen” Blacks would be admitted to only a few White schools but the majority would 
remain segregated (p. 83).  School leaders and citizens applauded standardized tests as a 
necessary requirement to uphold educational standards, but the goal was to defy 
desegregation mandates.  Supposedly objective measures were used to eliminate Black 
candidates for pupil transfer to White schools in a campaign called the “scientific way” to 
school integration (Wieder, 1987). 
 In 1960 New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS) became the first school district in 
Louisiana to desegregate, despite much protest and even an attempted coup by the state 
legislature (Baker, 1996).  Although state and local officials assured that token 
integration of only the most talented Black students would occur, Whites immediately 
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boycotted the desegregated school system.  Black students steadily repopulated these 
emptied schools post-desegregation. The Black student population in New Orleans Public 
Schools had been 57 percent prior to school desegregation in 1960.  It rose to 70 percent 
in 1970, 86 percent in 1984, and 92 percent in 1993 (Baker, 1996, p. 472-473).  In 1981, 
court-ordered desegregation of East Baton Rouge Parish also led to White boycotts and 
the repopulation of Black students in Baton Rouge’s public schools.  According to 
Bankston and Caldas’ (2002) seminal work on Louisiana desegregation, the percentage of 
Black students in East Baton Rouge Parish remained constant during the years 1960-1980 
at just under 40 percent.  The onset of court-ordered desegregation and busing in 1981 
lead to a “precipitous flight of White students to Baton Rouge’s nonpublic schools” (p. 
89-91).  The percentage of Black students in East Baton Rouge public schools rose to 44 
percent in 1981 and nearly 70 percent in 2000 (p. 90-99).  White students that remained 
in East Baton Rouge public schools were heavily concentrated in magnet schools that 
were created to stem the tide of White flight.  The declining percentage of White students 
in public schools occurred when the total population of White residents actually increased 
in Baton Rouge.  The pattern in which desegregation lead to rapid and sharp decline of 
Whites in public schools was repeated in Lafayette (p. 111-112), Jefferson (p. 151), St. 
John the Baptist (p. 159), Rapides (p. 168), Caddo (p. 171-172), and Monroe (p. 183) 
parishes.  In 1960, just prior to desegregation in Louisiana, Blacks were 31.9 percent of 
the total population in Louisiana and 39.1 percent of all public school students (Public 
Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 14).  Although the total Black population of Louisiana 
had remained constant at about 30 percent, Black students increased to 47 percent of the 
public school population in the 1990s (Bankston & Caldas, 2002).  Importantly, Black 
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students dominated public schools in the strategic port city of New Orleans (93 percent) 
and the state capitol Baton Rouge (70 percent) by the end of the twentieth century.  By 
contrast, Whites were 67 percent of the state population, but only 44 percent of public 
school students in the 1990s.  Most Whites resettled in all-White or majority-White 
public school districts or utilized nonpublic schools, essentially continuing the system of 
segregated schooling post-Brown (Baker, 1996, p. 473).  
The Concern for Educational Quality 
  School desegregation was the impetus behind the decline of White students in 
public schools and in urban schools in particular, but the desire for educational quality 
was popularly stated in defense of these actions.  Leeson (1966) documented the rise in 
nonpublic school enrollment in Louisiana and around the country immediately following 
desegregation orders.  Parents cited the desire for “quality education” as their motivation 
for leaving public schools (p. 22).  The Louisiana Legislature even provided tuition 
grants for up to $360 to pay private school tuition (p. 22) until the action was ruled 
unconstitutional in 1967.  When New Orleans desegregated in 1960, Muller (1976) 
observed that New Orleans White private school enrollment rose by nearly 2100 and the 
parochial school enrollment increased by over 1000 in that same year (p. 88).  McDonogh 
#19 Elementary School, one of the two desegregated White schools in New Orleans in 
1960, was completely boycotted by Whites by the end of the first week of desegregation 
although only three Black students had been admitted (p. 87).  In the 1970-1971 school 
year alone the nonpublic enrollment in New Orleans increased by 90.3 percent over the 
previous year (Erickson & Donovan, 1972). “Race-related events” were the “most 
powerful explanatory variables” for the rapid enrollment in nonpublic schools (Erickson 
38 
 
& Donovan, 1976, p. 3), although parents discussed race in terms of their concern for 
quality in educational outcomes.  The Public Affairs Research Council (1969) found that 
for most Whites, the “concern for educational outcomes [was] fed by long-held attitudes” 
toward Blacks that invoked segregationist ideals (p. 43).  Although concerns for 
educational quality were used in defense of White flight from public schools, the rate and 
scale in which Whites fled schools suggest the desire to uphold segregation was 
preeminent in their actions.  
  However, in some cases Whites who feared their children would be desegregated 
to a predominantly Black school did have legitimate concerns for educational quality.  
Although public education in general progressed more slowly in Louisiana than in 
Northern states, the conditions of Black schools comparable to those schools serving 
Whites were grossly unequal (Public Affairs Research Council, 1969).  In 1950-51, on 
the eve of Brown, 34.4 percent of Blacks attended small one-teacher schools compared to 
only 3.3 percent of Whites.  There were 191,284 Black students registered in schools, but 
only 5,528 teachers hired to teach them.  Black teachers were paid 30 percent lower than 
White teachers, despite their higher rate of advanced degrees and the much higher 
student-teacher ratio in Black schools. The inventory value of school facilities and 
equipment in Black schools was three times lower than the value of White facilities 
(Public Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 18-19).  Due to underfunding of Black 
education pre-Brown, most Black schools were unequal to White schools in the quality of 
facilities, resources, curriculum, and opportunities for advancement.  These concerns for 
educational quality fueled Blacks’ efforts toward school desegregation and greater racial 
equality.  However, these same concerns for educational quality discouraged many 
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Whites from desegregated schools with significant Black populations.  Even Whites 
sympathetic to school desegregation were unwilling to enroll their children in their 
neighborhood school if the school was predominantly Black (Public Affairs Research 
Council, 1969, p. 43).   
Whites’ resistance to desegregated schools, either due to racism or legitimate 
concerns for educational quality, only exasperated low support for public education in 
general and particularly in New Orleans and East Baton Rouge Parish where Blacks were 
overrepresented. For example, New Orleans voters rejected tax increases to support 
public schools from 1967-1980—representing 13 years of declining local revenues to 
supplement state funding.  At that time about 85 percent of the school system’s 84,000 
students were Black (Moore, 1981).  Charles Martin, the retiring school superintendent of 
New Orleans Public Schools in 1980, cited the lack of community and financial support. 
as the central reason for a multi-million deficit of the school system at the end of his 
term.  Martin remarked to the Times Picayune in his final interview, “Having adequate 
funding does not guarantee quality, but the absence of the dollar ensures inferior 
education” (McKendall, 1985, p. 4).  As more public schools desegregated, and 
specifically in New Orleans and Baton Rouge, public schools became synonymous with 
poor educational quality.  This unfavorable image of public schools was partly due to 
economic divestment in public schools post-desegregation and partly because of a strong 
desire to uphold racial segregation. 
The Campaign Against Social Promotion 
Despite a negative public school image, graduation rates in Louisiana 
significantly increased in the immediate years following desegregation.  In 1967 the 
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graduation rate of White students was 68 percent in comparison to about 42 percent of 
Black students (Public Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 26-27).  However, the Black 
graduation rate was three times greater than it was only a decade earlier in 1957.  Black 
schools had greatly improved in student promotion or “holding power” as a Public 
Affairs Research Council report noted (Public Affairs Research Council, 1969, p. 26).  
Black student promotion and graduation rates were likely assisted by the rise in Black 
teachers, who also rose to the proportionate 36 percent in 1967 (Public Affairs Research 
Council, 1969).  Louisiana’s rising graduation rates were emblematic of a growing 
national trend to expand high school programs and compulsory attendance laws.  School 
desegregation and civil rights laws granted racial minorities more access to secondary 
education, which played a tremendous role in Louisiana where Blacks students accounted 
for about forty percent of all public school students following desegregation (Bankston & 
Caldas, 2002).  A sharp increase in Black high school graduates was viewed suspiciously, 
however, especially since Blacks’ standardized test scores often still lagged behind 
Whites.  The concern was immediately raised in New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS), 
Louisiana’s first desegregated school system, during the Orleans Parish School Board 
election in 1972 (The Times Picayune, November 1972, p. 7).  At a League of Women 
Voters campaign forum in 1972, school board candidates discussed the success of teacher 
certification tests in eliminating unqualified teachers and the need for competency tests in 
schools to remove social promotion.  
 Social promotion had become a growing concern during the desegregation era, 
and states such as Florida and Mississippi passed legislation in 1975 for statewide testing 
programs to reduce social promotion and toughen graduation requirements in schools 
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(Schechter, 1981).  By 1978 the social promotion crisis rose to national prominence and 
spurred education reform towards minimum competency testing throughout the country.  
CBS News produced a three-part evening news series, “Is Anyone Out There Learning? 
A Report Card on American Public Education,” that symbolized the national mood 
concerning social promotion (CBS Broadcasting Inc., August 22, 1978).  This series 
labeled recent high school graduates “functional illiterates” who glided through 
coursework without learning basic reading, writing, or communication skills.  The lack of 
student motivation, the series continued, led to disciplinary problems, drugs, and violence 
in high schools within major American cities.  Later that same year, Louisiana officials 
held an education conference in the New Orleans Superdome entitled, “Louisiana: 
Priorities for the Future” (Grady, 1978).  Participants discussed the results of a recent 
education taskforce, who raised the issue of social promotion as the most pressing 
problem facing Louisianans. The taskforce questioned the literacy skills of recent high 
school graduates and complained that the business community was bearing the financial 
responsibility of training new employees in remedial literacy and communication skills.  
One of the centerpieces of the taskforce recommendations was the administration of a 
comprehensive examination as a vehicle for certifying the competence of high school 
graduates (Grady, 1978).   
 School desegregation dismantled Louisiana’s traditional dual system of racially-
segregated schools, and expanded access to the state’s large Black student population.  
State officials and a racially conservative White majority rallied against unpopular 
desegregation mandates and what was perceived as an increasing number of incompetent 
high school graduates.  The campaign against social promotion and desegregation 
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mandates, coupled with the growing negative image of public schools in New Orleans 
and Baton Rouge, pressured state policymakers for immediate and aggressive school 
reform. The years 1972-1974 introduced a new governor and state constitution to tackle 
educational policy and governance that would provide the infrastructure needed to 
engineer a comprehensive high stakes testing program. 
 
Governor Edwin Edwards and the 1974 Constitution 
 Edwin Edwards was first elected in 1972 and eventually served four terms as 
Louisiana’s governor (1972-1980, 1984-1988, and 1992-1996).  He was born in 
Avoyelles Parish, a rural area of Louisiana populated by French-speaking Cajuns.  After 
a short career as a lawyer in southwestern Acadia Parish, he began his political career as 
a local city councilman in 1954.  Ten years later he won an election to the Louisiana State 
Senate and, after only one year in the state senate, he was elected to the United States 
House of Representatives in 1965.  When he became governor in 1972, Edwards 
positioned himself as a populist Democrat in the likeness of Huey P. Long.  This populist 
image extended throughout his political career, and he is credited for increasing 
government aid to the poor and making Black and women appointments to civil service.  
However, Edwards’ governorship was marred by criminal indictment and conviction for 
numerous charges of political corruption.  Political scandal and personal infidelities 
dominate his biography and other publications about his life (Honeycutt, 2009; Bridges, 
2002).  
 Although Edwards is most remembered for his public criminal trials, he worked 
privately to engineer significant reform to Louisiana’s educational system.  His 
43 
 
gubernatorial terms coincide with Louisiana’s desegregation period and the transition to 
standards-based reform.  During his first campaign in 1971, Edwards promised a 
Constitutional Convention to modernize the language and functionality of Louisiana’s 
existing 1921 Constitution.  Soon after his election, a total of 132 delegates met on 
Louisiana State University’s campus to debate and revise articles relating to education, 
labor, and legislative procedures.  Congressional delegates were former or existing state 
legislators and Edwards appointees (Ducote, 2001).  According to their changes in the 
new 1974 Constitution, the state legislature must “provide for the education of the people 
of the state and shall establish and maintain a public educational system consisting of all 
schools” (LA Const. Art. VIII § 1).  The wording “education of the people” was added to 
the Constitution to broaden the legislature’s jurisdiction beyond only public education.  
Another section provided for a new Board of Elementary and Secondary Education 
(BESE), created as body corporate to “supervise and control the public elementary and 
secondary schools” and assume “budgetary responsibility for all funds appropriated or 
allocated by the state for those schools” (LA Const. Art. VIII § 4, A).  BESE became the 
state legislature’s policymaking arm that oversees both the School Superintendent and the 
Department of Education.  BESE assumed budgetary and policymaking powers for public 
schools as a constitutionally-protected body.  In a later section of the Constitution, private 
schools could apply for a certificate of approval from BESE which “shall carry the same 
privileges as one issued by a state public school” (LA Const. Art. VIII § 4).  Members of 
the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB) objected to these changes in constitutional 
language, which they viewed as a veiled attempt to extend monies to private school 
education under constitutional protection.  In a letter to the Elementary and Secondary 
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Education Subcommittee, they argued that, 
The OPSB sees this change as a threatened reduction in funds for public 
education. The OPSB reaffirms its conviction that public funds should not be used 
for the general support of non-public schools. (Louisiana Constitutional 
Convention Minutes, August 29, 1973, p. 52)  
  There was marked disagreement at the Constitutional Convention on whether BESE 
members should be elected or appointed by the Governor.  Edwards lobbied for the 
authority to appoint both BESE members and the State School Superintendent.  By 
removing the elective office, BESE members would be answerable to Edwards instead of 
local citizens in public school districts.  Louisiana voters ultimately rejected Edwards’ 
proposal of appointed BESE members and State School Superintendent, but governors 
were granted three appointees to BESE’s eleven-member Board.  BESE has eleven 
members who serve four-year terms with no term limits for office.  Eight members are 
elected from specially-drawn BESE districts and three are appointed by the Governor.  
Edwards used these appointees to represent gubernatorial interests in fiscal and 
policymaking decisions, and he assumed an influential role in BESE through his political 
muscle within the state (Honeycutt, 2009).  Later, Edwards was also successful in 
changing the elective position of the State Superintendent to an appointed post.  A 1984 
conflict with Thomas Clausen, former teacher and last elected Superintendent, arose 
when Clausen wanted to reduce the passing score for the teacher certification test without 
BESE approval.  Edwards “ felt the move was diametrically opposed to new initiatives 
and countered with a bill not allowing the Superintendent to lower standards” 
(Honeycutt, 2009, p. 221).  Following this bill, Edwards obtained the legislative backing 
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to make the Superintendent a BESE-appointed post through legislative act.   
Another disagreement at the 1974 Constitutional Convention was the issue of Black 
representation on BESE.  J.K. Haynes, a member of the Elementary and Secondary 
Education Subcommittee at the Convention, submitted a proposal for Blacks to receive 
equal or at least proportionate representation on BESE.  The motion was ultimately 
denied, but delegate Anthony Rachal submitted a separate statement to the Constitutional 
records expressing his disappointment considering the large Black public school 
population in the state (Louisiana Constitutional Convention Minutes, 1973).  Keith 
Johnson, BESE’s first Black member, was elected from New Orleans in 1984 and 
remained the only Black member until the mid-1990s.  
 The 1974 Constitution ushered in significant changes educational policymaking in 
Louisiana that directly influenced the development of high stakes testing.  With the 
creation of BESE, state lawmakers established a constitutionally-protected body to 
develop and execute policies as an agency of the state legislature.  BESE had the capacity 
to implement school policy in a more efficient manner than the lawmaking process.  
BESE also solved the legislature’s earlier problems with constitutionality when a judge 
disallowed its intervention into the New Orleans desegregation crisis of 1960; BESE was 
constitutionally-protected to intercede in local public school systems and provide the 
necessary oversight.  The 1974 Constitution also expanded privileges to private schools 
and broadened the state’s responsibility to both public and private education.  This 
change in constitutional language signaled the state’s intention to extend their educational 
appropriations and political support to nonpublic schools.  As the desegregation period 
loomed forward particularly in Baton Rouge and New Orleans, nonpublic schools 
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established standing to compete for funding from the state’s education budget.  
Competition for state funds grew significantly during the late 1970s and early 1980s due 
to a financial recession that gripped state government.  
 
The Oil Boom and Bust 
 Since the decline of cotton and agricultural production in the early twentieth 
century, Louisiana shifted to an industrial economy that relied on the mining of its natural 
resources—principally oil, natural gas, and timber.  Louisiana’s lucrative oil and gas 
lands accounted for nearly 50% of the state’s revenues by the 1970s and garnered oil 
lobbyists a powerful voice in educational policy (Southwest Educational Development 
Laboratory, 1999, pg. 1-2).  Oil companies depended on low-skilled laborers to support 
drilling operations in rural Louisiana, and they often rallied against higher taxes to fund 
large-scale school initiatives.  When the price of oil dropped sharply in the 1980s, 
however, high unemployment and reduced revenues lead to large state deficits.  
Postsecondary and K-12 education programs were among the state’s largest expenditures, 
and legislators pressed for ways to hold schools accountable for their funding.  Unlike 
most states, Louisiana finances its public education system mainly through sales taxes 
rather than property taxes.  Protected by constitutional language, Louisianans enjoy 
substantial homestead exemptions where most citizens pay virtually no property tax 
(Clendinen, 1986).  With fewer tax revenues from its oil income, state legislators relied 
more heavily on sales taxes from local businesses to fund its education programs.  In 
response, business organizations such as the Louisiana Association of Business and 
Industry (LABI) and the Public Affairs Research Council (PAR) objected to higher taxes 
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to support what they considered wasteful spending in public schools.  These leading 
business organizations sponsored research and public forums to press for school 
accountability, education standards, and reduced taxes.  In fact, it was the Public Affair 
Research Council executive Ed Steimel that first used the term “school accountability” at 
the 1972 Constitutional Convention in discussions concerning BESE (Louisiana 
Constitutional Convention Minutes, 1972).   
 The Public Affairs Research Council (henceforth called by its common name 
PAR), established in 1950, is a policy research think-tank that investigates state and local 
government issues in Louisiana (PAR, www.la-par.org). It was founded by a group of 
leading professionals in industry, education, business, and government.  As a nonpartisan, 
nonprofit research organization, PAR is supported through tax-deductible donations from 
its prominent membership.  According to its website, PAR does not lobby but its 
“research gets results” through policy recommendations that lead to governmental 
reforms.  PAR “plants the seeds, cultivates the field of public opinion, and let others 
lobby.”  PAR planted its strongest seeds in educational reform, particularly standards-
based reform and school accountability.  Its investigative reports concerning K-12 school 
accountability can be traced as far back as the early 1980s, just as declining oil revenues 
began to deplete state reserves.  The business community demanded greater urgency in 
school regulations that motivated legislators to act on recommendations to toughen 
promotion and graduation guidelines. 
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Dissatisfaction with Minimum-Competency Tests 
The Rise of Minimum-Competency Testing 
 Louisiana’s first testing program began in 1920 as a component of the State 
Supervisory Program initiated by then-Superintendent T.H. Harris (Rogers, 1936).  Harris 
created the program to promote school curricula reflective of Anglo-American history, 
language, and culture.  The testing program was discontinued in 1933, and state interest 
in standardized curriculum and assessment waned until the National Association of 
Educational Progress (NAEP) tests were first administered in 1969 (Louisiana 
Department of Education Math Highlights Report, 1976).   In response to Louisiana’s 
below-average performance on NAEP tests, the Louisiana Department of Education 
(LADOE) created the Louisiana Assessment Program in 1973.   Modeled after NAEP 
assessments, the Louisiana Assessment Program tested a stratified random sample of 
15,000 students and 5,000 students were tested in each key age level (nine year olds, 
fourteen year olds, and seventeen year olds).  Reading tests were first administered in 
1973, followed by Math and Social Studies in 1974, and Science in 1976.  Louisiana 
students performed comparable to their southeastern counterparts in all academic areas, 
but continued to score below the national average (Louisiana Department of Education, 
Math Highlights Report, 1976).   Louisiana’s lagging performance on these normative 
tests fueled political debates concerning social promotion just as Blacks’ access to 
desegregated schools widened.   
 State legislators passed the state’s first school accountability act in 1977.  Act 
621, The Public School Accountability and Assessment Act, authorized statewide 
minimum standards in pupil proficiency in reading, writing, and math (R.S. 17:391.1-
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391.10).  One of the sponsors of this act was Cecil Picard, a state representative from 
Vermillion Parish first elected to the state House of Representatives in 1975.  Picard, a 
former high school principal, was later elected to the state Senate in 1979 and appointed 
chairman of the Senate Education Committee when LEAP was developed and 
implemented.  The Public School Accountability and Assessment Act required a system 
of shared accountability for all stakeholders to perform their respective responsibilities 
and duties in public education (Official Journal of the State, 1977).  A list of stakeholders 
held accountable to taxpayers included BESE, local school boards, administrators, 
principals, teachers, parents, and students.  The Act sought to assure that all programs 
“lead to the attainment of established goals for education” and basic, uniform skills and 
concepts were identified for each grade level (p. 1687).   The law also stipulated that all 
students, rather than a randomized sample, would be tested in key grade levels and 
specified increased appropriations to the education budget for this purpose.  The Act 
authorized a system of accountability for public schools (albeit very generally), and 
directed BESE and the State Superintendent to decide the policies, standards, 
assessments, and grades to be tested.  Importantly, a section of the Act specifically 
dictated that the testing program should not be used to deny students promotion or 
graduation.  In Section E, the law stipulated that,  
No provision of this Part shall be construed to mean, or represented to require, 
that graduation from a high school or promotion to another grade level is in any 
way dependent upon successful performance on any test administered as a part of 
this testing program (Official Journal of the State, 1977, p. 1688) 
In compliance with Act 621, BESE coordinated with State Superintendent J. Kelly Nix to 
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adopt minimum standards in reading, writing, and mathematics, and to establish the new 
Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) as a minimum-competency test for all 
students in grades 7 and 10.   In the Superintendent’s first legislative report of the LSAP, 
the tests were purposed to measure student performance and obtain demographic data 
related to student achievement (Legislative Report of the Louisiana State Assessment 
Program, p. 3).  The LSAP was intended to promote school accountability through 
monitoring student progress, publishing test results, and assisting instructional planning 
to improve performance. Schools were advised to consider the reading assessments as a 
factor in student promotion, and literacy was the only subject area that was emphasized in 
promotion according to the law.   
 In 1979, just two years after its first accountability law, the state legislature 
passed Act 750, the Competency Based Education Law, which requires BESE to develop 
minimum standards and curriculum guidelines in all core content areas at all grade levels 
(Official Journal of the State, 1979).  This Act established the Louisiana Competency 
Based Program as a comprehensive educational program based on core curriculum 
standards, a literary assessment, and pupil progression plans.  Pupil progression plans 
were defined as a set of criteria each school system must evaluate to determine 
promotional and retention decisions.  Local school systems had to submit pupil 
progression plans for approval by BESE before implemented.  The law directed school 
officials to place emphasis on “mastery of reading, writing, and mathematics as 
consideration for promotion and placement provided that other factors shall be 
considered” (Official Journal of the State, 1979, p. 2099).   A new testing program called 
the Basic Skills Testing Program (BST) was also included in the legislation to measure 
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student achievement in reading, math, and language arts abilities at all grade levels.  To 
increase student accountability, substantive changes to promotion guidelines were made: 
1) mathematics and language arts were added to reading as promotional subjects; and 2) 
the state tests were described as “principal criteria” for grade-to-grade promotion 
(Pechman, 1982).  The Basic Skills Test (BST) was a criterion-referenced, minimum-
competency test first administered in 1981-82 school year to 56,000 second-graders. A 
new grade level was added to the student assessment program each year (third grade BST 
was added in 1983; and fourth grade was added in 1984).  BESE made plans to add a new 
grade level each year until all grades 2-12 were tested in 1992.   The new Competency 
Based Education Law reiterated the stipulation in the earlier Public School 
Accountability Act, which indicated that teachers determined promotion or placement of 
students but particular emphasis should be placed on students’ mastery of basic skills 
(Official Journal of the State, 1979, p. 2102).   The competency based education law did 
not specify that student mastery would be defined solely by the Basic Skills Test, but it 
did repeal Section E of the earlier Public School Accountability Act.  This section 
specifically stated that promotion and graduation could not be denied because of failing 
scores on the state exam.  Section E was “hereby specifically repealed” in clear, stated 
terms in the new Competency Based Education Law (p. 2103).  In addition, the new law 
required summer remediation for students who failed the BST and appropriated monies to 
operate remediation centers in central locations throughout the state.  
 By 1980, two student assessment programs emerged in Louisiana under mandate 
from the state legislature.  First, the Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) was 
authorized in 1977, and the State Superintendent decided to assess secondary students in 
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grades 7 and 10 with the purposes of publishing test results and gathering demographic 
data relative to student achievement.  In the LSAP students were scored by the 
percentage of correct answers on the test, but it did not establish a cut-off score for 
student performance.  The LSAP was primarily used to publish student achievement 
results and aid instructional and promotional decisions.  Second, the Basic Skills Test 
(BST) was authorized in 1979 for grade 2 in Reading and Math achievement, wherein 
eventually all grades would be tested by 1992.  BESE required students to attain at least a 
75% proficiency level to successfully pass the BST.  Teachers had the option of retaining 
or promoting students who lacked proficiency on the BST, but local districts had to 
include the BST as a factor in promotional decisions.  BESE required school districts to 
develop a pupil progression plan, a policy that outlined specific criteria for student 
promotion, in which BST scores were made a principal criterion.  Rather than using a 
commercial standardized test, the state legislature contracted with a testing agency to 
develop, administer, and score the Basic Skills Tests (Rachal & Hoffman, 1985).  A 
committee of teachers, principals, parents, and interested citizens collaborated with the 
testing agency to identify skills and concepts included in curriculum standards and 
assessed by the BST and LSAP.  These educators were integral to standard setting, test 
development, and field testing.  The Superintendent provided a Calendar of Skills to 
inform parents of skills to be learned and an individual report on student progress. The 
BST was designed to end social promotion by requiring all students to master basic skills, 
establishing a cutoff score for proficiency levels, and holding all students accountable to 
taxpayers.  
In the post-desegregation era, many state governments implemented minimum-
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competency testing programs similar to Louisiana’s Basic Skills Test (Pipho, 1978). The 
socio-political climate of the 1960s and 1970s differed greatly from the industrial period 
of the early twentieth century. Airisian (1987) describes this episode in American history 
as the “age of equity,” beginning first with the historic Brown (1954) decision and 
continuing with civil rights legislative and policy initiatives at the local, state, and federal 
level (p. 396).  School policy reform adopted three approaches to educational equity: 
equalizing inputs or financial resources among schools; equalizing outcomes in 
achievement or opportunity; and increasing inputs for low-performing students in order 
to equalize outcomes (Serow & Davies, 1982; Shepard, 1980).  In addition to educational 
equity, policymakers sought to address the perceived lack of intellectual rigor in schools. 
Competency-based education fit neatly with public ideals for both school equity and 
intellectual rigor. Its antecedents are found in the theoretical works of Carroll (1963) and 
Bloom, Hastings, & Madaus (1971) that describe a mastery learning model where every 
student could achieve a criterion level of knowledge and skills. Instructional inputs 
(resources, materials, and instructional support) are differentiated according to students’ 
needs, and constant testing and remediation ensured every child progressed to the 
intended level.  In school practice, competency based education required every student to 
demonstrate mastery or attainment of specified criteria (Palardy & Eisele, 1972).  
Minimum-competency testing was promoted as a policy of school equity because it 
publicly identified the specific learning objectives that would be tested; acted as a 
diagnostic mechanism to identify students requiring remediation; and allowed state and 
district officials to intervene directly into classrooms to promote equal educational 
outcomes (Winfield, 1990).  It also functioned as a policy to end social promotion. Test 
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development was generally made by authorities external to the teacher or local school 
district, and scores were often the determining factor in grade-to-grade promotion or high 
school graduation. By the mid-1970s over thirty-five states required local school districts 
to authorize MCT in elementary and secondary schools, including Louisiana (Pipho, 
1978).  Louisiana’s Basic Skills Test (BST) was more aggressive than most minimum-
competency tests at the time because the BST would eventually assess all grade levels as 
a form of universal achievement testing with cutoff scores for student performance. 
Concern for Social Promotion Unabated 
 In just three years Louisiana officials implemented statewide curriculum 
standards and corresponding assessments for both elementary and secondary levels, yet 
there was still public concern that the tests were not rigorous enough to eliminate social 
promotion.  In 1981 the Times Picayune published an influential education series called 
New Orleans Schools in Crisis. In the opening article, author Molly Moore wrote, 
In the last 20 years, the New Orleans Public School System has fallen into a 
critical state of academic, physical and financial despair. It is a school system of 
poor children, dilapidated schoolhouses, pinched budgets and a dismal public 
image. If it is judged on the quality of students it is producing, the system 
generally earns failing grades. (Moore, 1981, pg. 1) 
Moore continued by noting the system’s declining test scores on national norm-
referenced tests and low scores on the new state BST implemented earlier that year.  In a 
separate article examining the rise in remedial education at area colleges, Moore decried 
recent graduates’ lack of college readiness and skills that render them unprepared for 
college-level work.  Echoing the sentiments of many BST critics, Moore complained that 
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another decade would pass before social promotion would be curbed throughout the state.  
The BST was designed to add grade levels incrementally each year when public schools 
required more immediate action to improve academic standards.   
 A year after the Picayune education series, students’ relatively high scores on the 
BST also did little to satisfy public scrutiny.  On the first BST results in 1982, 89 percent 
of all students passed both the Reading and Math sections, 92 percent passed Reading, 
and 95 percent passed Math (Hays, 1982).  Students in the New Orleans metropolitan 
area showed the widest discrepancy in test scores, but test scores reflected socio-
economic differences rather than race.  In New Orleans Public Schools (NOPS), a 
predominantly poor and Black school district, 75 percent of all students passed both 
sections of the BST.  The same passing rate was found in neighboring St. Bernard Public 
Schools, a predominantly poor and White school district.  But in St. Tammany Parish, an 
affluent suburb of New Orleans, student test scores were among the highest in the state 
(Hays, 1982).  By 1984, the state’s average score for second-graders topped 95 percent 
and 97 percent in Reading and Math, respectively. The state averages for third-grade 
Reading and Math proficiency were 93 percent and 89 percent, respectively. The state 
averages for the new fourth grade tests were 87 percent and 89 percent in Reading and 
Math, respectively.  Overall, students performed very well on the BST statewide, far 
outperforming the 75 percent proficiency level set by BESE. 
 New Orleans Public Schools, although still showing one of the lowest BST 
district averages, had improved to meet the state average for all grades except the fourth 
grade in 1984.  However, not all New Orleanians were convinced of the school system’s 
academic progress.  A group of New Orleans citizens from its affluent uptown 
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neighborhoods formed a citizens’ task force in 1984 to investigate “unlikely scores” on 
the BST and any occurrences of testing abuse (McKendall, 1984).  Although no cases of 
testing abuse were found, task force member and Tulane professor Samuel Stringfield 
volunteered to continue the analysis of testing results to further investigate test scores in 
New Orleans.  In an interview with the Times Picayune, Ellen Pechman, Director of 
Testing and Evaluation for the Orleans Parish School Board (OPSB), attributed the rising 
test scores to improved instructional practices and greater familiarity with curriculum 
standards and assessments. In a later editorial to the Times Picayune, local principal 
Edward Washington questioned the public distrust of rising test scores in New Orleans.  
Washington criticized the lack of congratulatory response received from the both the 
Picayune and the larger New Orleans community to acknowledge that public school 
teachers and students performed well (Washington, 1984).  
 Criticism against the BST program grew as test scores continued to improve and 
their effect on social promotion appeared minimal.  In Baton Rouge’s legislative 
newspaper, The Advocate, lawmakers began to publicly complain that BST program 
wasted state funds at a time when the state’s reserves were scarce.  Since 1982, oil 
reserves fell from a high of 1.6 billion to just under $800 million annually (Clendinen, 
1984).  The 1979 Competency Based Education Law appropriated $506, 000 to the 
Department of Education to operate the new Competency-Based Program, and 
particularly student summer remediation and the BST.  Half of Louisiana’s oil profits had 
disappeared, just as the costs of financing public education increased.  
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Standards-Based Reform in Louisiana 
 The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan was the impetus for educational reform that 
promoted standard courses of study using a classical liberal curriculum.  The Reagan 
administration organized a national commission to investigate a perceived mediocrity in 
the public schools that threatened the country’s ability to produce a competitive 
workforce.  The National Commission on Excellence in Education released its Nation at 
Risk report in 1983, and set the course for a national movement toward standards-based 
reform (SBR).  The report contained thirty-eight recommendations for establishing 
school excellence through aggressive policymaking, standardized curriculum, and 
rigorous assessments (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983).  A year 
later the Education Commission of the States (ECS) convened a national conference with 
state policymakers to discuss school excellence and implementation of Nation at Risk 
recommendations (Pipho, 1984).   
The excellence rationale espoused egalitarian ideals that required every student to 
master a uniform and rigorous program of study regardless of social, familial, or racial 
backgrounds. School excellence advocates claimed benefits to both the student and the 
state; students gained higher-level skills and equal opportunity to learn, and the state 
gained a competent citizenry that ensured the continued prosperity of the nation.  For 
school excellence advocates these “higher-level skills” were found in traditional 
academic disciplines of the natural sciences and humanities. Finn & Ravitch (1984) were 
especially outspoken critics of functional or social education as the harbinger of 
mediocrity in school curriculum.  In Against Mediocrity, the authors summarize the ideals 
of the excellence movement and its egalitarian mission when they penned, 
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 Those who today would deny the humanities as part of the educational birthright 
 of every American are denying the very dream of a free and just society for all. 
 (Finn & Ravitch, 1984, p. 241) 
The standards-based reform (SBR) movement in Louisiana emerged from debates 
surrounding Nation at Risk and well-known school excellence advocates such as Chester 
Finn and Diane Ravitch.  Such rhetoric represented a shift from earlier equity rationales 
of school policy reform that were supported by desegregation advocates.  Rigorous 
curriculum and assessments replaced minimum competency testing as the preferred 
policy to raise educational standards, provide equal opportunity, and prevent social 
promotion.  The excellence rationale resonated sharply in Baton Rouge, where the 
contentious 1981 desegregation mandate pressed conservatives in Louisiana for the use 
of more aggressive testing policies to stymie school desegregation. Many hoped SBR 
would satisfy court mandates for equal access and opportunity, while toughening 
promotion and graduation guidelines.  
 Soon after Nation at Risk was released in 1983, election campaigns for local 
school boards and BESE were overrun with education conservatives seeking candidacy to 
instill academic excellence in schools.  Most significantly, the newly elected State School 
Superintendent Thomas Clausen ran a highly publicized and successful campaign against 
minimum competency testing in 1983.  In an interview with The Times Picayune, he 
argued that student mastery of curriculum standards, rather than basic understanding, 
should be used as the barometer for student promotion (The Times Picayune, June 1983).  
Once elected, Clausen authorized the LADOE’s Bureau of Evaluation to lead two studies 
investigating alternative testing strategies for Louisiana other than BST.  Hoffman (1984) 
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conducted one study, and reported that both parents and local school systems desired 
higher standards of curriculum and assessment for students.  Later, in an analysis of 
student remediation and effect on BST scores, Rachal and Hoffman (1985) found that 
remediation did not improve student deficiencies in students who failed the BST.  In 
order to ensure students possessed adequate skills and concepts, failing students required 
both remediation and retention in their current grade level.  These two studies were 
supported by mounting criticism of the BST program, particularly from lawmakers and 
the press, who argued that the BST lack rigor and failed to prevent social promotion.  The 
BST was attacked for lacking difficulty (reflected by the high passing rates) and 
reinforcing low standards for students.   
 Newly-elected BESE members also undertook greater action toward standards-
based reform and high stakes testing.  In early 1984 BESE voted new requirements for 
high school graduates that increased both high school course requirements and introduced 
a high school exit exam (Loupe, 1984).  Following recommendations from Nation at 
Risk, BESE increased high school coursework to four units of English, three units of 
math, three units of science, and three units of social studies.  BESE reduced elective 
offerings and standardized core courses so that all students followed uniform curricula 
throughout the state.  BESE also voted to establish a high school exit exam for graduates 
in order to receive their diplomas.  The proposed requirements, including exit exam, were 
intended for all schools carrying the BESE seal—both public and private.  In a separate 
meeting concerning elementary education, BESE voted to increase the BST cutoff score 
to 80 percent, and students who failed to achieve 80 percent proficiency on the BST were 
recommended for retention (The Times Picayune, January 1984).  BESE’s actions were 
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streamlined to the central ideals of standards-based reform.  Standards-based reform’s 
core educational philosophy—the idea that school systems could achieve equity and 
excellence through standardized curriculum and assessment versus desegregation 
mandates—provided a policy framework to balance minority rights with the demands of 
a conservative majority.   
 BESE’s decision to establish a high school exit exam proved more difficult to 
implement than expected, considering the public mandate for raising academic standards 
in schools.  Nonpublic parents and students objected to BESE’s private school stipulation 
in their reform agenda, and petitioned the state legislature to prevent BESE from 
overstepping their regulatory authority (Johnson, 1995, p. 186).  Also, the state’s 
impending financial crisis threatened to halt any reform initiatives from taking root.  The 
costs of running the existing BST program and remediation were plenty for the state’s 
strained education budget, and the legislature funded the program by making other cuts to 
the basic operating budget for schools.  Although state education officials embraced high 
stakes testing reform, BESE’s 1984 reform initiatives were delayed by the impending 
financial collapse of the state.  SBR could not advance in Louisiana without a consistent 
funding source to protect reform initiatives against future budget shortfalls.  
 
The Louisiana Quality Education Fund 
 The BST program caused the price of public education to surge with little 
evidence of curbing promotion and graduation rates.  By the mid-1980s lower oil 
revenues began to make a considerable impact on the Louisiana economy and the future 
of the BST.  The 1979 Competency Based Education Law required the state to provide 
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remediation for all students who did not reach mastery on the BST, but these funds had to 
obtain approval from the state legislature each year.  Remediation programs were fully 
funded for only the first year of the BST, but funds for the second year were not 
forthcoming (Peck, 1981).  Sixteen remediation centers were proposed in the original law 
but half of those could not be established due to lack of state funding (Peck, 1981, p. 5).  
Student remediation programs were funded through per-pupil allocations to the education 
budget that were separate from the funding formula for basic school operations, called the 
Minimum Foundation Formula.  With little state aid to provide for student remediation, 
school systems with larger underperforming populations such as New Orleans and St. 
Helena parishes shielded the financial burden for BST remediation out of their operating 
budget (Hodge, 1984).  These local school districts began to challenge the BST’s role as 
“principal criterion” in promotion decisions given the lack of state funding for student 
remediation.  The weakening state economy threatened the future of BST or any 
comprehensive school reform agenda.   
In early 1985 a growing state deficit set records in Louisiana history, and most 
believed Louisiana’s experiment in standards-based reform was doomed.  The 1985 BST 
administration was cancelled entirely because the legislature failed to appropriate monies 
to finance the testing program (Wardlaw, 1986).  Also, the Times Picayune published 
another scathing education series in 1985 called, “Cheating Our Children” (The Times 
Picayune, October 1985).  The Picayune based their education series on a newly released 
report by the Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI).  The LABI report 
found that Louisiana school systems spent a higher than average proportion of monies on 
support services such as transportation, food, and school counselors.  The report 
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attributed the state’s below-average student achievement on the misappropriation of 
school funds by local school systems.  It also suggested that school systems required 
better management of existing monies instead of additional funding.  LABI lobbied 
aggressively against higher taxes, and supported cuts to school funding that would 
eliminate administrative and support staff.   
 Governor Edwards was re-elected in 1984 amid huge state deficits and the 
inability to deliver on campaign promises for comprehensive education reform.  Edwards, 
who defended the BST program as a model for increasing student achievement for all 
Louisiana’s children, pledged to reduce the existing education budget by 5 percent and 
re-evaluate the BST program and its effectiveness in school accountability (Clendinen, 
1986).  He hurried negotiations for a settlement with the federal government concerning a 
long-running court battle over mineral rights and industry profits from the Gulf of 
Mexico shoreline.  In November 1985 Edwards announced the “8g” settlement, a $700 
million windfall from the federal government to end Louisiana’s suit over mineral rights 
and revenues from its shoreline.  Edwards backed a bill by Baton Rouge State Senator 
Thomas A. Hudson, who wanted to place the money into a dedicated trust for education.  
Edwards and state legislators placed about $600 million into a constitutionally-dedicated 
education trust to support high stakes testing reforms.  The money was placed in an 
interest-bearing account that would yield about $200 million for Louisiana each year, 
commonly called The Louisiana Quality Education Fund or “8g” funds.  PAR’S Edward 
Steimel, now representing Louisiana Association of Business and Industry (LABI), 
lobbied state government in support of using the multi-million dollar windfall to protect 
the education reform agenda (Wardlaw, 1985).  Steimel had good reason to doubt the 
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security of high stakes testing in Louisiana’s troubled economy.  The following year, 
1986, was the worst economic year in Louisiana since the Great Depression.  The state 
legislature faced at least a $420 million shortfall for the fiscal year 1986-1987 (Wardlaw, 
1986).  The education trust guaranteed continual funding for education reform, while 
lifting the heavier tax burden on businesses that were reluctant to fund public education.  
The money would yield revenues in the form of interest, divided equally between BESE 
and the Board of Regents, to finance policy-making and governance.  The Louisiana 
Quality Education Fund gave BESE a vital funding source to finally continue its 
standards-based reform agenda.   
 
Summary 
 School desegregation resulted in significant changes to the social context of 
public schooling that planted the seeds for high stakes testing and the LEAP.  First, 
school desegregation led to swift abandonment of public schools by the White middle 
class and high rates of private and parochial school enrollment in the political strongholds 
of New Orleans and Baton Rouge.  Second, it resulted in more pronounced racial 
segregation as Whites depopulated racially mixed areas in favor of racially homogenous 
areas in rural and suburban communities. Third, desegregation did little to alter 
conventional racist attitudes and public policies toward Black education in Louisiana.  As 
Black students and teachers repopulated schools deserted by Whites, the traditional 
divestment in Black education resumed once a public school became identifiably Black.  
Desegregation changed school demographics in the political centers of Baton Rouge and 
New Orleans, resulting in waning support and low confidence in the educative value of 
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public schools.  This poor image heightened skepticism of students’ academic 
achievement as evidenced by rising promotion and graduation rates.   
 Rising graduation rates and poor educational quality in public schools had 
become a growing concern for education conservatives in the 1980s, and many states 
enacted minimum-competency testing to certify students’ competence.  Louisiana acted 
in a similar vein, but state leaders became dismayed with students’ relative success in 
passing minimum competency tests.  Many believed the tests reinforced low educational 
standards, raised education costs, and failed to curb social promotion.  Elected education 
officials such as the State Superintendent and BESE accelerated plans for standardized 
curriculum and rigorous testing, drawing upon recommendations issued by the 1983 
Nation at Risk report and education taskforces.  The central reason for implementing high 
stakes testing in Louisiana was the elimination of social promotion, which was viewed as 
the cause of incompetency in high school graduates.  Desegregation policies and the 
equity rationale grew more unpopular in the early 1980s, and the excellence rationale 
dominated the new conservative era of American politics.  School excellence could be 
achieved through rigorous and uniform standards of curriculum and assessment; 
Standards-based reform remedied the problems of social promotion, educational quality, 
and racial inequity.  However, the impending economic recession hampered any 
education reform in the state until the Louisiana Quality Education Fund was established 
in 1986.  Once a continual funding source was created, state education leaders moved 
aggressively to implement the LEAP. 
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           CHAPTER 4 
A CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF THE LOUISIANA EDUCATIONAL 
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM (LEAP) 
 
 In the previous chapter, I outlined important sociopolitical factors that drew 
Louisiana policymakers to standards-based reform and high stakes testing.  These reform 
agendas were justified by the excellence rationale, which espoused rigorous student 
testing, stringent promotion and graduation guidelines, and elimination of school 
desegregation mandates.  In this chapter, I examine the lawmaking and policymaking 
process that resulted in the LEAP, in particular the actions of Louisiana state officials to 
implement the high stakes testing program.  The first installment of the LEAP program 
was enacted in the state in 1986 and included K-12 assessments aligned to prescriptive 
state standards.  The law required local school systems to use the LEAP K-8 assessments 
to decide student promotion, but school systems did have some flexibility in promotional 
decisions based upon specific criteria and the academic needs of individual school 
systems.  Successful scores on the LEAP high school graduate exit exam, however, were 
required as a condition of obtaining a high school diploma in the state.  Because the tests 
were heavily weighted in student promotion and graduation, the LEAP is considered 
Louisiana’s first comprehensive high stakes testing program.   
The LEAP was redesigned under state law in 1999 as Leap for the 21st Century 
(LEAP 21), the brainchild of Louisiana Governor Murphy “Mike” Foster.  Foster, along 
with his BESE appointees Paul Pastorek and Leslie Jacobs, advanced a school 
accountability policy that tied LEAP test scores to school compensation, faculty and staff 
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evaluations, school quality and accreditation, and student promotion and graduation.  The 
LEAP 21 introduced rigorous testing formats that demanded content mastery as opposed 
to competency stressed in earlier LEAP tests.  In 2001, Louisiana became the first state to 
deny student promotion at the fourth and eighth grade level, and to deny a high school 
diploma, to those students who failed the LEAP 21/GEE state assessment (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2006).  The program received national praise from Education Week in 2004 
(Skinner, 2004), but Louisiana locals were divided in their support for the high stakes 
testing program.  Blacks rallied against the LEAP 21 in public protest and legislative 
action, but could not muster the larger political support to stymie the strict accountability 
policies associated with the testing program.  Educators also complained about the 
soaring costs of accountability mandates that contributed to poor teacher pay and 
increased teacher responsibilities. State policymakers defended the LEAP 21 as a policy 
to raise academic standards for all students, and state officials worked in concert to 
develop the LEAP as a high stakes testing program.  
 
LEAP Forward 
BESE takes the lead 
BESE was created under the 1974 Louisiana Constitution as a corporate entity 
with policymaking authority to supervise and manage K-12 education programs.  Once 
organized, BESE outlined clear intentions for high stakes testing reform; its policy-
making activities were often more aggressive than state education laws.  Louisiana’s 
1977 accountability law, which established the Louisiana State Assessment Program 
(LSAP), specifically prohibited school systems from denying promotion or graduation on 
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the basis of the state assessment (Official Journal of the State, 1977). Although state 
officials publicly praised competency testing to expose and reduce social promotion, and 
there was precedent for promotional and graduation tests in states like Florida and 
Mississippi, legislators were divided in their political support to use standardized tests as 
a basis for promotional decisions (Moore, 1978).  Opponents of promotional tests cited 
problems in test implementation and constitutionality.  Some legislators feared massive 
failure rates would deny diplomas to well-deserving students in their districts.  Others 
questioned the legality of promotional tests and considered the lawsuit pending against 
Florida’s 1975 state law that authorized its test-for-graduation requirement.  Florida’s 
Black students sued under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, and 
argued that past discriminatory policies of both the state and testing companies led 
Blacks to disproportionately fail the exit exam.  While the Florida case, Debra P. vs. 
Turlington (1979), was in litigation, Louisiana legislators decided to implement its testing 
program as simply an assessment measure.  Despite legislative refrain from promotional 
tests, BESE approved a proposal to require all eight graders to pass a basic literacy test 
before they could enter high school (Moore, 1978).  BESE’s decision occurred in 1978, 
the same year the Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) was first administered to 
seventh and tenth graders as a standardized assessment independent of promotion and 
graduation requirements.   
 A legislative subcommittee later met with Department of Education officials to 
discuss BESE’s eighth-grade promotional test (Moore, 1978).  Lawmakers’ concern for 
high failure rates resurfaced in the subcommittee talks, but New Orleans legislators 
defended BESE and the need for promotional testing.  Henry Braden, a veteran White 
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Senator from New Orleans, stated that “half of New Orleans graduates lacked 
competency at the eighth grade level” (Moore, 1978, p. 35).  He sought to expand the 
tests’ use by backing a grade-by-grade promotional test for all students at all grade levels.  
However, some legislators were reluctant to endorse the promotional test until 
information was gathered concerning expected pass/fail rates.  BESE’s policy also 
overstepped the constitutional language included in the existing Public School 
Accountability and Assessment Act, which invited legal challenges to its policy if 
approved.  The measure was tabled pending further legislative debate.  In 1979, Florida 
plaintiffs won their suit in Debra P. vs. Turlington (1979) and the test-for-graduation 
requirement was ruled unconstitutional.  Louisiana legislators were careful to craft 
pending high stakes testing legislation to avoid constitutionality issues witnessed in the 
Florida case.  Senator Braden won his appeal for grade-by-grade proficiency tests in the 
following 1979 legislative session, when he sponsored the state’s Competency-Based 
Education Law that established the Basic Skills Test (Official Journal of the State, 1979).  
The Competency-Based Education Law provided BESE the legislative backing to 
implement the grade-by-grade proficiency tests, but the law carefully stipulated that the 
tests were to be used as “principal criterion”—not sole criterion—for promotional 
decisions.  Undeterred from its high stakes testing agenda, BESE authorized Department 
of Education officials to attend an invitational symposium in 1981 called “Issues of 
Competency and Accountability” (Schechter, 1981).  Participants included state officials 
in the areas of research, evaluation, and curriculum from Arkansas, Texas, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Mississippi.  Louisiana’s representative was David Hamilton, 
Section Chief of Legislative and Legal Analysis in the Louisiana Department of 
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Education.  Diana Pullin, the staff attorney for Florida plaintiffs in the Debra P. vs. 
Turlington case, was a featured speaker.  Pullin advised participants on constitutional 
language for minimum-competency testing laws, the validity of criterion-referenced 
versus norm-referenced formats in law and policy, the use of standardized curriculum and 
textbooks to prevent charges of discrimination, and the importance of establishing a 
remediation program (Schecter, 1981, p. 19).  Such key advisement on constitutional 
issues in high stakes testing was significant to the Department of Education officials and 
their development of the LEAP.  Also in 1981, BESE asked a district court to clarify its 
authority as a self-governing constitutional body rather than an agency of the state 
legislature (Johnson, 1995).  In Aguilard v. Treen (1982), the Louisiana Supreme Court 
granted BESE general powers to set and implement educational policies in compliance 
with state law and directives of the state legislature.  The court concluded that BESE is 
not self-executing and cannot contradict legislative resolutions and statutes in pursuit of 
its constitutional powers (Johnson, 1995, p. 187).  Specifically, the court ruled that BESE 
had power to develop and execute educational policies as long as those policies did not 
contradict state laws and regulations.  
 In 1984 BESE took further action to toughen promotion and graduation guidelines 
through state testing following the Nation at Risk report.  First, BESE raised the BST 
cutoff score from 75 percent to 80 percent in order to increase proficiency requirements 
for elementary students.  A growing number of BST critics were skeptical of high passing 
rates that signaled minimal impact on student promotion.  Second, BESE adopted a plan 
in early 1984 that increased high school course requirements and standardized a more 
rigorous program of study (Loupe, 1984).  The plan also included a graduation test in 
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which successful scores were required to receive a high school diploma.  Both of BESE’s 
proposals overstepped the constitutional language used in the existing competency-based 
law.  BESE’s policy changes occurred in 1984, an election year, and local candidates 
popularized standardized curriculum and assessment in their education platforms.  Both 
State School Superintendent-elect Tom Clausen and Governor-elect Edwin Edwards 
pledged to increase academic standards through higher standards and more rigorous 
assessments. Soon after he was elected, Superintendent Clausen gathered research 
evidence to lobby for a tougher, more comprehensive student assessment program 
(Hoffman, 1984),  but he received pressure from the state’s largest teachers union to 
improve working conditions and pay before a costly reform plan was enforced.  
Clausen’s first task became negotiating with BESE to relax some of their policy changes 
for increasing and standardizing high school course requirements.  The BESE plan was 
endorsed by the Chamber of Commerce and the Business Taskforce on Education, Inc. , 
whose chairman replied in a Times Picayune interview that the changes would yield “a 
more literate and competent citizenry” (Roehl, 1984).  However, school officials attacked 
the BESE plan for its inflexibility, hastiness, and potential for increasing the drop-out 
rate.  A retired Louisiana educator remembered a meeting at a local school to discuss 
BESE’s plans for high school promotion and graduation requirements: 
BESE said they were going to change the classes and requirements for high 
school students. They said the changes were supposed to help all students get into 
college where they could get jobs.  But they wanted the changes to go into effect 
immediately without giving us [teachers] a chance to prepare students. The 
students were capable of doing the work, but to introduce the changes so quickly 
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without giving schools time to adjust was just setting the kids up for failure. We 
told the Board [BESE] that there were no options for students not considering 
college, and I thought it was unfair. (J. Smith, Personal communication, August 
21, 2011) 
Lobbied heavily by educators and school officials, Clausen proposed an alternative plan 
that granted more flexibility to local school systems and students to choose the courses 
that would satisfy the English, math, and science requirements.  For example, the BESE 
plan required three units of Math—Algebra I and II, and Geometry with no substitutions. 
The Clausen plan also required three units of Math—Algebra I and two years of either 
Algebra II, geometry, trigonometry, general math, business math, or calculus.  At a 
Louisiana School Supervisors Associations meeting in March 1984, parish school 
supervisors were divided over their support for Clausen and BESE (Loupe, 1984). BESE 
complained to state legislators and Governor Edwards—who had three appointees to the 
BESE board—that the elective office of the State School Superintendent posed confusion 
to the public over who held the political authority to set education policy.  BESE’s power 
struggle with State Superintendent Clausen delayed their plans to redesign high school 
curriculum and introduce a graduate exit exam.  BESE also had no funding source at the 
time and appropriations for the BST were taken out of the Department of Education 
budget, which suffered under state budget cuts as the oil crisis continued.  Governor 
Edwards resolved the major political and financial obstacles for BESE in the following 
legislative session, which made BESE’s high stakes testing policies possible.  
Governor Edwards Pushes Reform 
 In his 1984 election campaign, Governor Edwards unveiled an ambitious package 
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to reform K-12 education using standardized testing as a centerpiece to the reform 
agenda.   During a speech in early 1985 to the Louisiana School Boards Association, 
Edwards touted expansive reforms that would fundamentally change the entire 
educational system (Thibodeaux, 1985, p. 1).  His education plan included legislative 
proposals to make the State School Superintendent post appointive, award merit pay for 
teachers based on licensing exams, establish an education trust fund, secure monies for 
student summer remediation, require new administrators to pass a licensing exam, 
develop a teacher internship program, provide leadership training for principals, and 
replace the BST test with a nationally normed, commercial test for grades 2-11.  When 
the legislative session opened in April 1985, however, Edwards faced a severe economic 
shortfall and imposed spending cuts on all state services (Office of Planning and Budget, 
1985).  The 1985-1986 state budget lacked monies to finance Edwards’ educational 
initiatives, and they were postponed by the financial collapse of the state economy.  
 Cecil Picard, ranking member of the Senate Education Committee, publicly 
chided Edwards for failing to secure legislation to target testing programs for teachers 
and students (Thibodeaux, 1985, p. 1).  Edwards defended his actions as “political 
acumen” in understanding what reforms were essential, economical, and likely to get 
passed in a tense political climate (p. 4).  He abandoned pricey education packages to 
support key constitutional changes that would allow future high stakes testing legislation 
to advance.  Edwards lobbied heavily for a BESE-appointed State School Superintendent 
and to dedicate the “8g” oil settlement funds to the Louisiana Education Trust Fund.  The 
education trust, placed in an interest-bearing investment account, would yield monies to 
finance school reform initiatives in perpetuity.  Also, a BESE-appointed State School 
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Superintendent would relieve the public pressure on the School Superintendent and 
distinguish BESE as the policymaking authority in K-12 education.  Edwards’ victories 
in the 1985 legislative session were vital to BESE’s ability to authorize and finance an 
aggressive school reform agenda.  BESE gained about $20 million dollars as the first 
payment from the investment account, which it used to shoulder the cost of test 
development delayed by the budget crisis.  BESE members also welcomed their new 
power to appoint the State School Superintendent.  Clausen, still embroiled in his power 
struggle with BESE, had been admonished by Edwards for lowering the cutoff scores for 
the state’s teacher licensing exam.  Clausen faced a teacher shortage and heavy lobbying 
from teachers unions, but Edwards pushed a legislative resolution against Clausen’s 
actions and ruled them inconsistent with higher standards in K-12 education (Honeycutt, 
2009). The state’s first appointed State School Superintendent would take office at the 
close of Clausen’s term in 1988, and BESE selected William Cody for his replacement.  
Cody, a veteran educator from Alabama, introduced an exit exam for eleventh-graders in 
his earlier post as Superintendent of Schools in Birmingham (Mckendall & Wardlaw, 
1988). 
Legislative Power 
 In the following 1986 legislative session, a renewed sense of urgency pushed 
legislators to develop a state testing program that promoted standards, assessments, and 
accountability.  First, the existing Louisiana State Assessment Program (LSAP) for 
secondary students and Basic Skills Test (BST) for elementary grades had not deterred 
public concern for social promotion.  Results from both testing programs indicated 
proficiency levels above 80 percent, yet a key comparative testing study released by the 
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Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) placed Louisiana last among their southern 
counterparts in academic performance in 1986 (Southern Regional Education Board, 
1986).  Louisiana’s low scores in the SREB study and NAEP tests substantiated 
legislative proposals for immediate and rigorous state testing to enforce academic 
improvement in schools.  Also, White conservatives lobbied for policies that would 
achieve racial equity through school excellence and standards-based reform as opposed to 
existing court-ordered desegregation mandates.  Finally, Edwards convinced lawmakers 
chose to dedicate that substantial oil windfall to an education trust rather than balance a 
strained budget, and they were anxious to use those funds to secure a comprehensive 
testing reform package. State revenues had declined to their worst levels in 1986, and the 
House Appropriations Committee voted to discontinue funding for the BST program and 
halt testing administration.  The House chose to defer all financing for standards-based 
reform initiatives to BESE and the education trust instead of the general fund (Wardlaw, 
1986).  
 As a result of renewed vigor for student testing among legislators, two major bills 
regarding high stakes testing circulated in the 1986 legislative session. The first bill, Act 
146, established the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as a more 
rigorous assessment program to accompany the curriculum standards imposed by the 
earlier competency-based education law.  The LEAP act was sponsored jointly by 
chairman of the Senate Education Committee, Cecil Picard, and chairman of the House 
Education Committee, Jimmy Long.  First elected to the State Senate in 1979, Picard was 
a former teacher and principal in Louisiana’s rural Vermillion parish during the years 
1959-1979 (Louisiana Secretary of State List of State Senators since 1880, 2009).  He 
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retired from school administration upon election to the State Senate, and was hired as a 
consultant to a Louisiana petrochemical company.  Picard was instrumental in education 
lawmaking during the school desegregation era, and concentrated his earlier efforts on 
institutionalizing teacher licensing exams and a state teacher evaluation system.  In the 
previous 1985 legislative session he fought heavily to force all veteran teachers to submit 
to a recertification progress and obtain a passing score on the state licensing exam, but 
the measure was killed by the state’s largest teachers union (Thibodeax, 1985, p. 1).  
Picard was a leading spokesman for standardized testing to assess the competence of both 
teachers and students during the desegregation period.  Picard’s counterpart in the State 
House, Jimmy Long, was first elected in 1968 and served seven consecutive terms 
thereafter.  A businessman by occupation, Long represented the rural Winn parish of 
northwestern Louisiana. He garnered a reputation for being the state’s most powerful 
legislator concerning education law.  He represented Louisiana on the Southern Regional 
Educational Board and the Education Commission of States, the body that first 
administered the NAEP testing program in 1969 (Louisiana Secretary of State List of 
State Representatives since 1880, 2009).   
 Together, both chairman Jimmy Long of the House Education Committee and 
chairman Cecil Picard of the Senate Education Committee co-sponsored the LEAP law, 
which passed with large support from state legislators.  In terms of its constitutional 
language, the LEAP law differed from earlier laws only regarding the number and type of 
assessments that would be administered under the existing the Louisiana Competency-
Based Education program.  Act 146 established the Louisiana Educational Assessment 
Program (LEAP) as a “process of measuring pupil performance in relation to grade 
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appropriate skills, state curriculum standards, and national educational indices” (Official 
Journal of the State, 1986, p. 364).  The new LEAP program included specific 
instructions for a kindergarten assessment to inform student placement according to 
ability and readiness; criterion-referenced assessments in grades three, five, and seven 
aligned to state curriculum standards approved by BESE and used as principal criterion in 
promotion decisions; a national norm-referenced test administered to all students 
statewide in at least three grade levels; and an eleventh grade criterion-referenced test.  
The new assessments would require student “mastery of the grade appropriate skills” 
instead of “minimal competencies” stressed in earlier education laws (p. 366).   The law 
further indicated that student promotion “shall be based upon student performance on a 
criterion-referenced test on grade appropriate skills as defined by the state curriculum” 
(p. 366).  Like earlier testing programs, the law stated that “other factors shall be 
considered” in student promotion and school officials had ultimate authority in 
promotional decisions based on BESE-approved pupil progression plans (p. 367).  The 
law was carefully worded to refrain from language that would expressly prohibit or 
require school systems to deny promotion or graduation based on students’ test results.  It 
contained clear and urgent directives that test development should begin immediately.  
Pilot testing for the LEAP K-8 assessments were scheduled for the same year 1986-1987, 
with implementation to begin the following 1987-1988 school year. Pilot testing for the 
LEAP eleventh grade test was scheduled to begin in 1987-1988, with implementation to 
begin no later than 1988-1989 school year. 
Other important components of the LEAP law was the stipulation that all students 
who failed LEAP tests would receive remedial education programs according to BESE 
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regulations, and the provision to establish the Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing 
Commission to serve as advisor to BESE regarding the state assessments.  The 
membership of the 16-person Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission 
was specifically outlined to include a representative from all the major professional 
teacher organizations/unions, House Education committee, Senate Education committee, 
BESE, Board of Regents, Louisiana School Boards Association, Louisiana School 
Principals Association, Louisiana Association of School Superintendents, parent of a 
public school student (appointed by BESE), an interested citizen (appointed by BESE), 
and a college/university dean of education (appointed by BESE).  According to the law, 
the Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission was empowered to 
“recommend procedures for conducting, maintaining, and reporting reliable 
accountability measures of student performance” (Official Journal of the State, 1986, p. 
367).   A member of the original Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission 
reported political pressure to implement the testing program immediately, before there 
was even a remediation plan for failing students, 
A major focus of the LEAP commission was setting and approving the structures 
that would encompass the LEAP.  There was political pressure to put the system 
in place immediately, and such a policy required careful deliberation. I remember 
BESE appointed everyone on the commission and much of our discussion was 
based on whatever they had in mind.  Also, a major concern was that BESE had 
no plans for failing students. There was a sense that failing students would 
probably drop out and that it was okay because they were not deserving of the 
high school diploma. (B. Road Personal communication, August 22, 2011)  
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Lawmakers included the Louisiana Educational Assessment Testing Commission 
in the constitutional language of the LEAP law because it was an assurance to educators 
that they would have input in crafting LEAP policies for students and schools.  However, 
most of the members who served on the commission were named by BESE, which gave 
BESE members the most critical voice in shaping LEAP policy. The LEAP law 
represented Louisiana’s model of standards-based reform by requiring students to master 
rigorous curriculum standards and assessments as opposed to basic skills knowledge.  It 
carefully outlined a plan for rigorous standardized assessments to enhance the existing 
legislation on the competency-based law, but it did not specify punitive consequences for 
schools. There were high stakes only for students, whose promotion at key grade levels 
was now based on successful test scores on a LEAP test that required content mastery as 
opposed to basic skills.  The law also did not specify a student remediation plan, but 
indicated that remediation would be offered to failing students.  The ambiguity within the 
law made it unclear if remediation funds were the responsibility of the state in their 
annual budget, BESE, the Department of Education, or local school systems. The law 
was vague in outlining who would finance student remediation, which created a political 
football over who would shoulder the costs of remediating failing students.  
 
The LEAP Exit Exam 
 As the LEAP bill neared passage in 1986, another bill requiring a graduation exit 
exam was proposed by state representative B.F. O’Neal (United Press International, p. B-
2).   The bill would award a high school diploma to those students who passed the 
graduation test.  Failing students would receive a certificate of attendance rather than a 
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diploma.  The measure passed the Senate Education Committee but it was later rejected 
by the full Senate.  In the following 1987 legislative session, O’Neal proposed another 
bill to make the LEAP eleventh grade test a criterion for graduation (Hargroder & 
Anderson, 1987, p. 22).  O’Neal, a state representative from the northern city of 
Shreveport, introduced the bill as an accountability measure that would certify the 
competence of all high school graduates. The bill passed the state House but halted in the 
Senate Education Committee due to a tiebreaker vote made by a Black state senator from 
New Orleans (Hargroder & Anderson, 1987, p. 22).  Senator Dennis Bagneris was 
elected to the State Senate in 1983 and was vice-chairman of the Senate Education 
Committee.  He was also a member of the Legislative Black Caucus, whose membership 
rose along with Black voting power following the civil rights movement.   Bagneris 
succeeded in preventing legislation for a LEAP graduation test to move forward, and no 
other proposals surfaced in the state legislature afterward.   
 BESE began piloting the LEAP eleventh grade test in the 1987-1988 school year, 
and scheduled the first test administration in 1988-1989 under its new appointed State 
School Superintendent William Cody.  The following year 1990, BESE set an 
administrative rule making the LEAP eleventh grade test a graduation requirement even 
though the measure failed to pass in the state legislature three years earlier (Johnson, 
1995).  The LEAP eleventh grade test was renamed the Graduate Exit Exam (GEE) and 
made applicable to all BESE-approved schools—both public and non-public.  Private and 
parochial K-12 schools vigorously lobbied the state legislature to argue that BESE lacked 
constitutional authority to enforce such policy directives on non-public schools.  Under 
its statutory powers set forth by Aguilard v. Treen (1982), state legislators passed a 
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concurrent resolution exempting non-public students from the GEE and LEAP testing 
(Johnson, 1995).  Those students exempted from the GEE were students enrolled in 
private or parochial schools, home-schooled students, students who receive a General 
Education Diploma (GED), and students who matriculate from a non-public school but 
enroll in a public school in their high school years (Johnson, 1995, p. 188).   BESE 
members were divided over the legislative resolution to exclude non-public students, and 
some members argued that fairness demanded an all-or-nothing approach (Wardlaw, 
1990).  Board member Huel Perkins of Baton Rouge called the proposed graduation test 
“inherently racist” in a BESE meeting following the legislative resolution 
(Wardlaw, 1990, 1).  He continued that public school demographics indicated that Black 
schoolchildren would be more likely to succumb to the test than White schoolchildren 
who were exempt in non-public schools. Carson Killen of Gonzalez agreed that an 
uneven testing policy would single out public school students unfairly, and he introduced 
a proposal to make the test optional to non-public students.  In the end, members Killen 
and Perkins represented the minority among the BESE board and the Killen proposal was 
denied.  BESE acquiesced to the state legislature by revising their position on non-public 
students in the 1990 Louisiana Handbook for School Administrators (Standard 2.099.00, 
Bulletin 741).  Only public school students would be subject to the graduation exit exam.   
 When the GEE requirement was implemented in 1993, Black parents in New 
Orleans filed suit against BESE in  Rankins vs. Louisiana State Board of Elementary and 
Secondary Education (1993).  Using a similar argument raised in Florida’s Debra P. vs. 
Turlington (1981), plaintiffs charged the GEE violated the equal protection clause by 
establishing unequal rules for obtaining a high school diploma in the state of Louisiana 
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(Johnson, 1995). They argued that state aid to non-public schools—which had risen to an 
estimated $20 million in 1986—substantiated their claim that non-public schools should 
submit to the GEE as well as public schools.  Plaintiffs continued that bias in test designs 
and development often produced racial disparities in test scores, which would 
disadvantage Black students otherwise qualified to graduate.  A New Orleans district 
court agreed with plaintiffs, finding that the GEE was unfairly and discriminately 
administered (Johnson, 1995, p. 189).    
BESE President James Stafford vowed his support for a court appeal to reverse 
the lower court decision that made the GEE unconstitutional.  He defended the GEE as a 
measure for ensuring higher academic standards in Louisiana public schools.  A divided 
BESE Board met in early 1993 to vote on a decision to appeal the Rankins case (Coyle & 
Wardlaw, 1993).  BESE’s only Black member, Keith Johnson of New Orleans, 
unsuccessfully sided with the minority vote to discontinue the GEE out of fairness to 
public school students and respect to the judicial decision.  In a split 6-5 vote, BESE 
voted to appeal the Rankins decision in the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals.  
Publicly, Governor Edwards did not offer any comment on the graduation test and stated 
that he wanted to show respect for BESE’s authority in setting educational policy.  
However, all three of Edwards’ appointees to the BESE board voted to appeal the 
Rankins decision, which signaled Edwards’ commanding role in safeguarding the GEE 
from legal challenges.  
A year later BESE won their appeal in Rankins, and the appeals court found that 
BESE did not exceed its constitutional authority because “the statute is devoid of 
legislative intent regarding graduation exit exams” (637 So. 2d pg. 555).  In the absence 
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of specific legislation against the GEE or certain provisions associated, the court held that 
BESE is constitutionally empowered to implement the exam as the governing board for 
elementary and secondary education.  The appeals court maintained that BESE possessed 
power only to approve non-public schools but lacked authority to enforce its policy 
directives in schools protected by religious freedom (i.e. Catholic schools).  The court did 
not address homeschooled students, GED students, or non-religious private schools who 
were also exempt from the GEE.  In regard to the equal protection challenge, the court 
found that unlike the Debra P. case, BESE’s GEE was a criterion-referenced test aligned 
to a state curriculum required for all students in all schools under all conditions.  Because 
test development was not based on social or nonacademic factors, but rather on a 
disclosed set of curricula, test bias was an insufficient claim to establish an equal 
protection violation (Johnson, 1995, p. 187-190). Subsequently, both the Louisiana 
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court denied later applications for a writ 
of certiorari to review the decision made by the appeals court.   
Louisiana’s dual system of graduation requirements remained a contentious issue 
that divided communities along both racial and class lines.  Unlike the LEAP K-8 
assessments, the GEE was inflexible in granting local school officials some influence in 
awarding high school diplomas. The GEE was a five-part examination that included 
separate assessments in English, math, science, social studies, and writing.  Students had 
to successfully pass all five parts to receive the high school diploma.  The LEAP act does 
include student remediation in its constitutional language, but the law does not clearly 
establish the agency responsible for financing remediation.  The Louisiana Educational 
Assessment Testing Commission was successful in pressing state education officials for a 
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remediation plan before the first administration of the LEAP test (Associated Press, 
November 1988), but local school systems increasingly absorbed these costs.  A 
remediation program was critically important at this juncture the because the graduate 
exit exam was an inflexible policy that denied a high school diploma to any failing 
student.  Increasingly, local school systems were saddled with expensive remediation 
programs that pinched strained budgets in the economic recession.  
Despite these criticism of the GEE, the LEAP program remained relatively 
consistent over the next ten years.  The LEAP program replaced minimum-competency 
testing with rigorous K-12 assessments that required content mastery. BESE defended the 
GEE as a necessary tool to prevent social promotion and guarantee graduates who were 
capable of succeeding in college and professional employment.  The high stakes fell 
mainly on students, whose promotion and graduation were largely based on the LEAP 
tests.  About ten percent of students each year were denied their high school diplomas as 
a result of the GEE, and Blacks represented about 80 percent of these GEE failures 
(Bankston & Caldas, 2002).  Although the failure rate was greater in the LEAP K-8 
assessments, school systems were flexible in their decision to promote students based on 
factors that included classroom performance and teacher recommendation.  By 1996, 
however, the new Louisiana governor Murphy “Mike” Foster revived the excellence 
rationale to seek tougher accountability policies for the LEAP K-8 assessments.   
 
LEAP for the 21st Century (LEAP 21) 
Mike Foster and his school accountability czars 
As governor, Edwin Edwards wielded significant power in the state’s K-12 
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education program and the LEAP was created under his leadership.  Edwards was 
succeeded by Republican Governor Murphy “Mike” Foster in 1996, and Foster’s 
educational vision really crafted the LEAP into a weapon for school accountability.  
Foster was born in Franklin, Louisiana as the son of a wealthy sugar planter and owner of 
oil and gas lands.  Foster’s father, Murphy Foster, Jr., was a former Louisiana governor  
and United States Senator.  Foster grew up on his family’s sugar cane plantation near 
Shreveport, Louisiana.  He entered politics at the age of 57 as a Louisiana State Senator 
in 1987. While serving his second term as state senator, he ran a successful campaign for 
Governor and eventually served two terms (1996-2004).  He campaigned on a 
conservative platform, promising to reduce aid to welfare programs, end affirmative 
action and racial quotas, and toughen criminal justice laws (Dictionary of Louisiana 
Biography, 2008; Williams, 2004).   
Foster was endorsed by Ku Klux Klan member David Duke in 1995, and Foster 
pled guilty to an ethics violation for paying $150,000 to Duke for a mailing list of Duke’s 
supporters (La Campaign Finance Opinion No. 99 – 360).  The National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) protested Foster’s immediate end to 
statewide affirmative action programs after his election, and they marched outside the 
Governor’s Mansion in early 1996.  A White-rights group, the National Association for 
the Advancement of White People, rallied on the same day in support of Foster (Shuler, 
1996, 1).  A pro-business governor, Foster sought tax decreases for the business 
community and policies to increase profitability within the state.  He also changed the 
state’s grant program to college students, the Tuition Opportunity Program for Students 
(TOPS), so that eligibility was based on merit (GPA and test scores) as opposed to 
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financial need.  
 In his first election, Foster sought total gubernatorial control of BESE and 
campaigned for an appointed Board.  “The buck will stop with me and my appointees.  
That can't happen with a BESE board that's mostly elected - no matter how fine the 
people who end up on it," said Foster to the Baton Rouge newspaper The Advocate in 
1995 (The Advocate, October 1995).  He argued that an elected board would be more 
accountable to their constituents and a hindrance to his bold school accountability agenda 
that pushed sanctions against failing schools and school systems.  Foster’s threats to 
BESE members were genuine, and he found legislative support to abolish BESE in his 
first term.  In both the 1995 and 1997 state legislative sessions, House bills were 
introduced to reduce BESE to an advisory body and make the state superintendent post-
appointive by the governor (The Advocate, June 1995).  After meetings with Foster and 
his staff, BESE members pledged support to Foster’s policies for high stakes testing in 
elementary grades, penalties and sanctions against schools and teachers, and strict 
oversight into low-performing school districts. 
 Unlike Edwards, who appointed teachers and educators to BESE in his tenure, 
Foster’s BESE appointees were business and law professionals with no classroom 
experience.  Paul Pastorek, an appointee of Foster in 1996, became President of BESE in 
2002 and later appointed by BESE to State School Superintendent in 2007 (Louisiana 
Public Broadcasting, 2011).  A corporate attorney, Pastorek began practicing law in 1979 
as a litigator specializing in corporate and transactional law.  For nearly thirty years 
Pastorek has been an attorney with the law firm of Adams & Reese, one of largest firms 
in the southeastern United States.  He is a longstanding member of the New Orleans 
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Chamber of Commerce and currently serves as the chairman of the New Orleans 
Regional Chamber of Commerce Area Council Executive Committee.  He also serves on 
the Board of Directors for the Chamber of Commerce Greater Baton Rouge and the 
World Trade Center of New Orleans.  During his tenure on BESE, Pastorek played an 
integral role in the executive decision-making to utilize LEAP in order to evaluate, 
accredit, and penalize low-performing schools and districts.  He was a member of 
Louisiana’s LEARN Commission (1996) that supervised standards and curriculum 
reform, a member of Louisiana’s Public School and District Accountability Commission 
(1996-1999), and a member of Louisiana’s Task Force on Community and Vocational 
Technical Colleges (1997-1998).  He created the nonprofit Next Horizon as a statewide 
education think tank when he left BESE in 2004 (Louisiana Public Broadcasting, 2011). 
In 2007 BESE appointed Pastorek as the State School Superintendent and he was given 
the highest salary of any State School Superintendent throughout the entire Gulf Coast 
(Maloney, 2008). 
 Leslie Jacobs, dubbed as the architect of school accountability in Louisiana, was 
also a 1996 Foster appointee and Vice-President of the Board in 2008.  Born in New 
Orleans, she worked as an insurance executive at The Rosenthal Agency for three 
decades, and became President of the merged Hibernia Rosenthal Insurance when the 
company was purchased by Hibernia National Bank in 2000.  She entered educational 
policymaking in 1992 as an elected member of the Orleans Parish School Board.  She 
served on the Orleans Parish School board until 1996, when she was appointed to BESE 
by Governor Foster.  In her final years as BESE member she served as the Board’s Vice 
President.  Jacobs is credited with the successful implementation of the Recovery School 
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District, which is designed to take over the supervisory and budgetary management of 
failing schools.  The Recovery School District recruits charter school operators, 
educational management organizations (EMOs), and other private sector organizations to 
operate predominantly underachieving, low-income Black schools in New Orleans.  
Jacobs, regarded by many as the architect for school choice and competition in Louisiana, 
used failing LEAP scores and school accountability sanctions to overtake public schools 
and transfer control to private companies (Educate Now!, 2011).  
 Not only did Foster obtain pledged support from BESE members in enacting his 
strict school accountability platform, his appointees assumed Board leadership to assure 
Foster’s vision would be a preeminent focus.  Three years into Foster’s first term, he was 
so pleased with BESE that he publicly praised the Board for leading the nation in strict 
accountability policies and took measures to expand BESE’s power.   
The Foster Plan 
 Foster embraced two elements in his education platform: high stakes testing and 
school accountability based on rewards and sanctions for academic performance.  Soon 
after his 1996 election, Foster and State School Superintendent Raymond Arveson 
organized a 23-member Louisiana LEARN commission to study educational issues and 
develop a plan for policy reform.  Foster’s educational package drew upon the 
commission’s recommendations, which he unveiled during a televised news conference 
that aired on Louisiana Public Broadcasting stations around the state (Shuler, 1996). 
Foster acknowledged that both good and bad schools could be found throughout the state, 
but believed the key to improving bad schools was sanctions against them.  Foster 
identified bad schools as those with poor LEAP test scores and high rates of failure on the 
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GEE.  According to Foster’s news conference, these schools were bastions of persistent 
underachievement that should be held accountable to taxpayers and the students they 
serve.  Foster’s education policy would reward schools with proven records of academic 
achievement and sanction those who failed to improve student academic performance on 
the LEAP.  Low-performing schools would face financial sanctions, closure, takeover by 
a state-approved management agency, or obligatory student transfer to other public 
schools or private schools of greater quality.  The LEAP K-12 assessments were integral 
to Foster’s school accountability policy because school quality was judged on LEAP test 
scores.  Each school would receive a School Performance Score (SPS) as an annual 
quality rating (Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011).  Ninety-percent of the SPS at the 
elementary level was based on the LEAP K-8 assessments.  At the high school level the 
GEE passing rate and high school graduation rate accounted for ninety percent of the 
SPS.  It is important to note that since high school students cannot graduate without 
passing the GEE, the exit exam is an inherent factor in high school graduation rates 
(Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011).  Another important element of Foster’s education 
package was redesigning the LEAP assessments to increase their difficulty and 
proficiency levels.  Leslie Jacobs, member of the LEARN commission and later chairman 
of Foster’s K-12 education transition team, expressed concern for grade inflation in 
public schools to Baton Rouge’s Advocate in 1996.  She stated that too many students 
with high GPAs were failing the GEE or required to take remedial courses in college.  
She wanted the GEE test redesigned to contain tougher questions to reflect high 
expectations that the state had for student learning (Myers, 1996). Foster echoed these 
sentiments in his televised news conference and argued that the grade-appropriate skills 
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stressed in the LEAP assessment actually assessed minimum skill levels.  To increase 
Louisiana student performance in national rankings, state assessments should demand 
rigorous testing and higher proficiency levels to determine cutoff scores (Shuler, 1996). 
 Like his predecessor, Foster was unable to secure enough legislative support to 
appropriate additional monies to the Department of Education that would finance his 
education plan during the 1997 legislative session. His plan entailed rewarding high-
performing schools with financial bonuses, developing tougher tests, and shouldering 
costs for student remediation—all expensive policies for an unpopular public school 
system (Myers, 1997).  Both the Department of Education and the Minimum Foundation 
Program, which is the state school financing program, was funded through the annual 
state budget controlled by the state legislature.  Proceeds from the education trust were 
awarded to BESE during Edwards’ gubernatorial leadership to finance their 
policymaking activities.  Beyond the education trust and the Minimum Foundation 
Program from the state’s general fund, there was little political backing to appropriate 
more monies to an embattled public school system.  In 1998, Foster’s accountability 
program gained greater support after the release of key education rankings and national 
test comparisons reveal Louisiana’s dismal student performance.  In 1997, Education 
Week covered Louisiana’s public educational system and noted lagging academic 
achievement comparable to other states around the country (Lawton, 1997).  Louisiana’s 
1994 NAEP test scores were tied with California for the lowest reading scores on the 
NAEP tests.  Louisiana had the highest proportion of students—60 percent—that could 
not reach the basic level (p. 117).  An interesting note about the NAEP scores is that the 
1994 test scores were worse than the 1992 NAEP test scores, which signaled a drop in 
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students who scored at the proficient level and an increase in those students scoring at the 
basic level.  In addition, Louisiana’s ACT scores remained stagnant and below the 
national average from 1994 to 1997, fueling calls for even tougher standards and 
assessments (Shipley, 1997).  In 1998 BESE released a report indicating that about 2 
percent of Louisiana’s high school students were denied their high school diplomas 
because they failed the GEE.  The report indicated that most students who were denied 
their high school diplomas failed to obtain the necessary course credits to graduate.  The 
highest number of GEE failures were in New Orleans and East Baton Rouge parishes, 
which also had the highest number of students who had not accumulated enough credits 
to graduate.  This admission by BESE brought the LEAP/GEE tests into the forefront and 
revived old fears that the tests did not enforce school accountability necessary to prevent 
social promotion (Myers, 1998). 
 In the 1999 legislative session, Foster was able to convince state legislators to 
renew a state sales tax that would fund his educational investments to the Department of 
Education and propel his education plan forward.  He pushed LEAP 21 legislation to 
revise the Public School Accountability Act that would require all fourth and eighth 
graders to pass the LEAP test in order advance to the next grade.  All LEAP/GEE tests 
were redesigned to reflect the highest cutoff scores and proficiency levels in efforts to 
improve academic achievement. A key piece of the legislation was the School 
Performance Scores (SPS) to allow parents and communities to publicly compare schools 
to rate educational quality or lack thereof.  In 1999, when the new LEAP tests were first 
administered in public schools, one of Foster’s aides told Baton Rouge’s The Advocate 
that the new LEAP eighth grade tests were more rigorous than the current high school 
91 
 
exam (The Advocate, August 1999). About 44,000 fourth and eighth graders failed the 
new high stakes tests in the first 1999 spring administration.  Nearly one-third of 
students, or about 38,000, failed the tests in the 2000 spring administration (Johnson & 
Johnson, 2006).  The LEAP 21 program advanced very stringent accountability policies 
to end social promotion in schools and improve Louisiana’s rankings. It removed total 
decision-making power from teachers and local officials and legitimized unequal funding 
to state schools based on test scores.  In May 2008, the steady and massive number of 
student failures prompted state officials to change the all or nothing policy by permitting 
waivers and appeals (Sentell, 2008). 
 
Summary 
 Although Louisiana’s first state testing program ended in 1933, state leaders 
increasingly relied on standardized testing to maintain de facto segregation in the post-
Brown era.  Standardized tests became a popular method of limiting the number of Black 
applicants seeking transfer to desegregated White schools.  Once organized as a 
constitutional body in 1974, the Board of Elementary and Secondary Education (BESE) 
took immediate action to enforce a comprehensive state testing policy that would limit 
student promotion to high school.  In 1978, BESE authorized an eighth-grade functional 
literacy test for all students as a prerequisite to high school admission. Students who did 
not pass the literacy test were limited to a middle-school education and could not be 
promoted to high school.  BESE’s promotional test was more aggressive than the existing 
Louisiana State Assessment Program, which assessed basic literacy skills for high school 
students without impacting student promotion or graduation.  The eighth-grade 
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promotional test was tabled by state legislators, who were divided over their support for 
the test until more information was collected on demographic data related to passing and 
failure rates.  Veteran New Orleans state legislators particularly lobbied on behalf of 
BESE’s promotional tests, and the Basic Skills Test was approved for all students as a 
principal criterion of student promotion in 1979.  Following the Nation at Risk report, 
BESE sought to implement a high school graduation test in conjunction with increased 
course requirements for high school students.  BESE’s graduation test was delayed due to 
a divided state legislature and lack of financial resources, but Governor Edwin Edwards 
laid important foundations for high stakes testing in 1986. 
Governor Edwards particularly supported BESE’s reform agenda, and he enacted 
critical policies that allowed high stakes testing to take root in Louisiana.  Edwards 
secured a consistent funding source for BESE through the education trust, placed the 
School Superintendent under BESE’s authority, and was a decisive voice in the legal 
challenge to BESE’s graduate exit exam (GEE).  These developments allowed BESE to 
move forward with their plans for more rigorous testing and assessments geared at 
reducing social promotion.  Lawmakers strengthened the existing laws for competency-
based education by increasing the proficiency level students had to reach in order to pass 
the state tests.  The new proficiency requirements were announced in the 1986 LEAP 
law, which established the Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (LEAP) as a 
comprehensive K-12 student assessment program that required students to attain content 
mastery of course curricula instead of basic skills.  The LEAP did not specify student 
consequences for failure, but state tests were still regarded as the principal criterion in 
student promotion.  After ten years of LEAP testing, Louisiana’s new Governor Mike 
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Foster, Jr. introduced LEAP for the 21st century to promote school accountability. The 
LEAP 21 established an aggressive accountability framework where schools were 
rewarded or sanctioned based on students’ LEAP scores.  The tests themselves were also 
redesigned to require students’ content mastery according to national, norm-referenced 
indices.  Massive student failures accompanied the LEAP 21 tests, which resulted in 
unequal funding allocations to schools and school systems throughout the state.   
There are several implications of the LEAP program for Louisiana students and 
schools.  Because of Louisiana’s large private and parochial school attendance rates, the 
LEAP’s punitive consequences primarily befell poor families with limited options for 
schooling and education.  Second, due to the Whites’ boycotting of desegregated schools, 
Blacks are more concentrated in public schools and form the majority of K-8 public 
schoolchildren (Bankston & Caldas, 2002). Louisiana’s Black population is just over 30 
percent, which is a higher percentage than other states throughout the country. The Black 
public school population amounts to about half of all Louisiana public school students, 
and Louisiana’s Black student population is double the national average (National Center 
for Education Statistics State Education Data Profiles, 2010). Black public school 
students especially outnumber Whites in the urban cities of New Orleans and Baton 
Rouge, where Blacks represented 90 percent of public school students during the 1990s 
(Bankston & Caldas, 2002). As a result, Blacks are more greatly impacted by demands 
for school accountability. Lastly, the LEAP policies and laws are vague in their 
description of funding to meet accountability mandates and provide student remediation.  
Increasingly, local school systems bore the costs of accountability mandates, which left 
many schools systems more financially destitute.  
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       CHAPTER 5 
                         IMPLICATIONS 
 
 In 2001, Johnson & Johnson (2006) completed a yearlong study in a rural 
Louisiana elementary school to investigate the effects of LEAP 21.  Using “thick 
description” qualitative methods, the researchers obtained a one-year teaching post at 
Redbud Elementary School and took copious notes of their daily activities.  Seeking an 
insider or “emic” perspective on LEAP 21, the researchers examined several implications 
for teaching and learning in a high stakes testing environment.  The authors describe 
Redbud Elementary School as a dilapidated facility lacking in even basic resources such 
as a working telephone in the main office (p. xviii).  Although most of the teachers were 
White, students were predominantly poor and Black.  Teachers practiced “regulated 
teaching,” or pedagogy in which scripted curriculum guides indicate a specific curricular 
focus, instructional concepts, assignments, materials, and pacing for each lesson. Because 
of LEAP 21, curriculum standards increased from the previous year and limited 
instructional time to study the prescribed curricula in-depth.  Teachers spent much of 
their time preparing students for the LEAP 21 tests; little instructional resources were 
used beyond test preparation books, supplements, and computer programs.   
 In piercing detail, Johnson & Johnson (2006) describe narrowed curriculum, 
intensive test drills, underfunding, overworked teachers, student anxieties, smart and 
capable students, but only minimal student learning at Redbud Elementary.  When 
students’ test results were released at the end of the school year, about 74 percent of 
Redbud fourth graders failed either one or both of the LEAP 21 English/Language Arts or 
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LEAP 21 Math tests, and faced retention unless the students could pass the tests in a 
summer makeup administration (Johnson & Johnson, 2006, p. 165).  Statewide about 42 
percent of all fourth graders failed to pass the required LEAP 21 tests and faced 
automatic retention (p. 165).  The Redbud study illustrates the implications of high stakes 
testing for poor and underachieving schools in Louisiana, whose entire school culture is 
engrossed in test preparation and remediation.  The study exposes the limitations of 
regulated teaching and packed curriculum that creates a stressful learning environment 
for students and teachers. Importantly, the Redbud study indicates that intensive high 
stakes testing actually does little to improve student achievement, as reflected by 
students’ dismal test scores in spite of relentless test preparation.  
According to interviews with teachers and students present when LEAP and 
LEAP 21 were first announced, the Redbud study examines one facet of the high stakes 
testing program.  Participants also identified other significant implications of the LEAP 
that exacerbated perennial problems within Louisiana’s educational system.  First, the 
LEAP accentuated the class disparity between non-public school students and public 
school students.  The LEAP contributed to a decrease in public school enrollment during 
the 1990s, and deepened the existing class divide between non-public and public schools.  
Second, local school systems had to absorb much of the LEAP test preparation and 
remediation costs.  Lastly, the LEAP instigated racial politics in public education policy 
considered part and parcel of Louisiana’s educational history.  For many Blacks, the 
timing of the 1986 LEAP law and corresponding GEE signaled an attempt to use 
achievement tests to undermine Black educational progress during the desegregation 
period.  The LEAP 21 rigorous accountability program, coupled by the fact that it was 
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spearheaded by Mike Foster, raised more suspicion within the Black community 
regarding the tests’ usefulness in improving public education for thousands of Black 
students in public schools.  
 
The Wealth Gap in Louisiana Schools 
 During the 1998 legislative session, lawmakers questioned rising public education 
costs despite a 10-year decline in public school enrollment (Myers, 1998).  Education 
officials attributed the costs to additional school personnel, whose numbers had grown 
exponentially in recent years to comply with accountability mandates.  The LEAP was 
enacted in 1986, and every year thereafter one employee had been added to the state 
payroll for every two students lost (Sentell, 2003, p. 1).  In 1986 the state’s public schools 
had 792, 831 students and 86,379 employees. The number of public school students 
dropped by about 27,448 in the period 1986-1997, but the number of school workers 
increased by half that amount (p. 1).  About 16 percent of Louisiana’s elementary and 
students were found in private schools by 1998, placing Louisiana third in the nation for 
private school enrollment (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1999). Louisiana 
also ranked number one in the nation for the largest number of dropouts per total student 
enrollment (National Center for Educational Statistics, 1999).  By 2003 Louisiana public 
school student enrollment dipped again to about 699,000.  The percentage of private 
school students remained at about 15 percent of all students, but the number of home-
schooled students and drop-outs increased significantly (Sentell, 2003).  Louisiana’s 
public school enrollment in the years following the LEAP diverged from national trends 
in public school attendance.  In the period of 1990-2000 Louisiana public students 
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declined by 5 percent, but public school enrollment rose nationwide by 9 percent during 
the same period (Sentell, 2003).   
 As earlier noted, Louisiana experienced a sharp decline in public school 
enrollment following school desegregation in 1960.  The number of public school 
students continued to decline throughout the 1990s, which exasperated the wealth gap 
between non-public and public schools in Louisiana.  Nonpublic school enrollment rose 
to 22 percent for Whites and 5 percent for Blacks during the 1990s, representing about 
one-third of Louisiana students (Bankston & Caldas, 2002, p. 146).  The rise in private 
and parochial school attendance rates made Louisiana’s dual educational system more 
entrenched within the state.  Poor and lower classes became increasingly concentrated in 
public schools, whereas wealthy classes were increasingly concentrated in non-public 
schools.  By the year 2000, about 66 percent of all public school students were receiving 
free or reduced lunch and labeled “economically disadvantaged” in the state records of 
student demographics (Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011).  In the major cities of New 
Orleans and Baton Rouge, the rate of economically disadvantaged students reached 90 
percent (Louisiana Dept. of Education, 2011).   
 Because there is a much higher concentration of Louisiana’s poor families in 
public schools, they are more adversely impacted by the punitive consequences 
associated with LEAP test scores.  It is important to note the excellence rationale that 
supported high stakes testing in Louisiana embraced an egalitarian and populist message. 
Governor Edwards, Superintendent Clausen, and BESE President James Stafford all 
defended the LEAP as a tool for raising academic achievement for all Louisiana students 
regardless of social circumstances.  Likewise, Governor Foster and BESE Vice-President 
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Leslie Jacobs popularized the LEAP 21 as a rigorous testing program to raise academic 
achievement in those students and schools with persistent academic underperformance.  
However, these state officials developed the LEAP and associated policies with an 
understanding that the high stakes testing program would largely impact poorer and 
working class families.  Although promoted as an equitable policy to enforce all students 
to attain high standards, the LEAP’s rigorous curriculum, testing, and demands on 
teachers and schools are largely enforced on poor students and families. The large 
failures rates on LEAP 21 signal a massive problem in which predominantly poor 
students are denied promotion and graduation because they cannot afford educational 
options where they are exempt from high stakes testing.  This educational structure 
creates restrictions on promotion and graduation for Louisiana’s poor and working 
classes that do not act as a barrier for many middle and upper class families.  
To illustrate the widening class rift in Louisiana’s educational structure and its 
effects on poorer children in public schools, a New Orleans teacher shared her 
experiences, 
The LEAP graduation test was not a major concern because almost everyone 
passed in the beginning.  I know one person whose child could not pass and the 
parents immediately withdrew the student and sent her to a Catholic school. This 
was about 1994.  The LEAP exit exam became more difficult later on, and we had 
lots of students who failed one or more parts.  By then we had poorer students 
whose parents could not afford to send them elsewhere. There was more pressure 
on these students to work while attending school, but once they had failed the 
LEAP, they just continued working and never came back. (H. Lane, Personal 
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communication, 2011) 
Another layer to the class divide in Louisiana schools is the power of the middle class in 
setting policies for the majority poorer classes in public schools. The middle class plays a 
larger role in shaping educational policy and discourse in the state that is sometimes 
contrary to the political voice of the poorer classes and their struggle for socio-economic 
mobility.  A teacher in rural Lafayette explained that high stakes testing in Louisiana 
developed as a consequence of middle-class families at the helm of decision-making.  
She saw the LEAP as a policy advanced by the middle class and more of a directive for 
the poor masses in the public schools, 
A lot of people are still upset that only public school students have to take these 
tests and teachers have no say at all in student promotion.  The state decided that 
rule and they did so because a lot of those state officials don’t have kids in public 
schools. That’s the problem.  Those running the schools have no vested interest in 
the public schools getting better.  They create policies that are both inflexible and 
unrealistic given the circumstances of public school students. (T. Howard, 
Personal communication, October 29, 2011) 
 These two teachers point to a class divide that became an increasing problem in 
Louisiana as a result of its high stakes testing program.  A middle class boycott of public 
schools can be problematic when school policy and financing decisions are largely made 
by middle class citizens.  The decision to implement the LEAP in nonpublic schools was 
met with vigorous opposition in the state legislature, but the same legislators agreed to 
such a policy for public school students.  High stakes testing may not have taken root in 
Louisiana if it was a truly universal policy in which all students, regardless of social 
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class, were subjected to the punitive consequences associated with student accountability.   
 
High Costs and Strained Budgets 
 In 2004 Education Week awarded Louisiana its top rating for standards and 
accountability, but graded the state a “D” in school financing and allocation of funds 
(Skinner, 2004).   BESE is charged with developing the state financing formula, the 
Minimum Foundation Formula, to determine the estimated costs of providing “a 
minimum foundation program of education for all elementary and secondary schools” 
(LA Const., Art. VIII, § 13).  BESE estimates annual educational costs to finance the 
Minimum Foundation Program (MFP) and submits this amount for approval from the 
state legislature. The state legislature appropriates monies for the MFP in the state budget 
each year.  Since 2000, the annual costs for educational programs are partly financed by 
the state and by each locality.  The MFP formula requires local school systems to supply 
35 percent of their education costs and the state pays 65 percent.  Failure to provide the 
local support share will result in a proportionate percentage reduction in state aid.  
Additionally, state law requires that 70 percent of MFP funding to local school systems 
are dedicated to classroom instruction (teacher salary and retirement benefits, materials, 
and instructional aides).  This financing model leaves just 30 percent of MFP shared 
among local schools to finance administrator salaries and benefits, utilities, supplies, 
maintenance, and extra-curricular activities.  From fiscal year 1992 to fiscal year 2002 
MFP appropriations grew by $664 million (Governor’s Office of Planning and Budget, 
2003, p. 35).  Much of the increase in school financing from 1992 to 2002 were 
earmarked for cost-of-living pay raises and increases in school personnel.  Accountability 
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mandates lead to an increase in hired specialists, special education teachers, consultants, 
administrators, and training programs, which absorb the increases in the Minimum 
Foundation Program at the local level.  These data indicate that there has been very little 
increased funding to local schools when LEAP and LEAP 21 were implemented, despite 
the rigorous curriculum and punitive consequences the tests imposed.  
 In fact, local schools receive even less funding for operating expenses because 
they have to finance student remediation to meet the state’s rigorous testing demands.  
Much of the appropriations for student remediation were contingent upon the availability 
of funds in the state budget.  For example, the state was supposed to open testing 
remediation centers statewide to provide remediation for students who failed the BST, 
but appropriations were made for only one year and local school systems bore the costs 
for summer remediation thereafter (Schechter, 1981). When BESE first proposed a high 
school exit exam in 1984 to accompany their more rigorous program of study, New 
Orleans shouldered the costs of summer school remediation for about 3000 of its under-
achieving high school students who had scored poorly on a basic skills test administered 
earlier in the school year (Hodge, 1984). Costs for the program totaled $312,000, which 
was a hefty price for the cash-strapped school system.  In 1986, the year the LEAP law 
was enacted, St. Tammany Parish Schools lost significant state aid due to budget cuts.  
The system lost over $250,000 for student remediation on the existing BST program and 
almost $300,000 from their MFP financing (Haley, 1986).  In fact all school systems lost 
monies in their MFP financing in 1986-87.  The year 1986-87 was the worst economic 
year of the oil crisis and the total MFP was cut by about $18 million in the state budget. 
Although the education trust was established also in 1986, BESE gained the interest from 
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the oil settlement to finance its policymaking and governing efforts.  The education trust 
financed high stakes testing reforms but did not fund increases in the MFP to finance 
local schools.  When the Foster administration established LEAP 21, the legislature 
appropriated millions in state aid to fund student remediation.  But the state’s 
appropriations only covered 80 percent of the summer remediation for failing students.  
Local school systems were required to pay 20 percent of remediation costs out of their 
MFP financing (Legislative Fiscal Office, Fiscal Highlights 2000, 2000). 
 Another important factor in school financing is the higher rate of poverty-stricken 
students in Louisiana schools (66 percent), who sometimes require extra services such as 
individual tutoring, speech therapists, or vision aids to assist their cognitive development 
and retention.  Louisiana’s students requiring an individualized educational program 
(IEP) numbered 85,119 or about 13 percent of the total student population in 2010 
(National Center for Education Statistics State Education Data Profiles, 2010). To 
comply with both federal and state accountability targets, the costs for educating special 
populations can be dramatic. In a 2011 analysis of special education services in charter 
schools in New Orleans, Bordelon (2010) found that children with disabilities were 
underrepresented in charter schools due to lack of identification and resources to fund 
adequate instruction. The costs associated with testing, evaluation, and accommodations 
can quickly drain the resources of charter schools, which create an incentive for charters 
to reclassify students or deny admission to those requiring costly services.  
 The state financing to local schools represent a fundamental problem in the 
potential success of the LEAP in improving school quality.  The LEAP demands 
academically rigorous curriculum standards and high proficiency levels for testing 
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performance, but schools are financed at a minimum level to support only basic operating 
services.  This mismatch between school financing and the expectations for student test 
performance creates an uphill battle for poorer school systems to improve student 
achievement on the LEAP. Local school systems fund testing and remediation costs at the 
expense of other priorities that would enhance the educational environment and support 
student learning.  Redbud Elementary, discussed in Johnson & Johnson’s (2006) study, 
lacked playground equipment, library, arts or music classes, extra-curricular academic 
clubs, and basic supplies. Such gross underfunding limits those educational experiences 
that would support academic and developmental growth. 
 A former Louisiana student, who failed the eighth grade LEAP 21 and took 
summer remediation in 2001, noted how remediation did little to help students because 
the school conditions were not improved, 
I failed the math LEAP.  A lot of people did and we had to go to summer school 
for like, three weeks.  It was so hot, and we had little fans in the windows.  The 
teachers just gave us workbooks and told us to do all the assignments to practice.  
To me it was a waste of time.  It would have helped if I had someone to work with 
one-on-one.  It wasn’t like I was dumb, I could get the right answers but just 
needed help on the steps.  The teachers said the tests were a lot harder because we 
had to show specific steps in our answers, we couldn’t just bubble in the right 
answers. I could never understand that. We have to get the right answer, but we 
also have to show every single step? (O. Price, Personal communication, August 
21, 2011) 
The LEAP 21 increased demands for student proficiency in skill development and critical 
104 
 
thinking, but there was little improvement in school environments a result of increased 
financial pressures to meet accountability demands.  One of implications of high stakes 
testing in Louisiana is the idea that academic achievement can be increased through 
classroom instruction alone, yet school facilities and the overall educational environment 
is neglected.  There is a resistance to funding capital improvements to schools as 
evidenced by state laws that limit MFP funding to expenditures directly related to 
classroom instruction.   
 
Racial Politics 
 As earlier noted, Blacks first challenged BESE’s LEAP/GEE graduation policy in 
a 1993 lawsuit charging discrimination against public school students.  Plaintiffs sought 
and won injunctive relief from the district court, but the decision was later reversed by 
the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeals in 1994.  Black plaintiffs’ subsequent writs 
of certiorari were denied by the Louisiana Supreme Court and U.S. Supreme Court 
(Johnson, 1995).  Although Blacks’ test scores on the LEAP/GEE typically lagged behind 
Whites, Blacks’ average test scores on the exit exam were satisfactory to pass the LEAP 
tests.  When the first GEE tests were administered in 1990, Whites had an average score 
of 79 percent correct and Blacks had an average score of 67 percent correct (Bankston & 
Caldas, 2002, p. 192).  However, Blacks were 78 percent of those who could not graduate 
because of failing one section of the LEAP/GEE.   In 1998 Baton Rouge’s Advocate 
reported that about 1500 Louisiana seniors could not graduate as a result of failing one 
section of the LEAP/GEE, and these students were concentrated in New Orleans and East 
Baton Rouge parishes (Myers, 1998).  By 1998, when Foster announced the LEAP 21 
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program and his intention to make the LEAP tests more difficult, Blacks vigorously 
opposed the new promotional policy for fourth and eighth graders that would determine 
student promotion solely on the results of a more difficult LEAP 21.  When LEAP 21 
was piloted in the 1998-1999 school year, 44,000 fourth and eighth graders failed and 
would have been retained under the new policy. The next year 1999-2000, the LEAP 21 
promotional requirement was instituted and 38,000 fourth and eighth graders failed one 
or both portions of the LEAP 21 English/Language Arts and LEAP 21 Math (Sentell, 
2000).  In total, about 30 percent of Louisiana fourth-graders faced automatic retention as 
result of failing one or both of the LEAP 21 sections. 
 Bill Quigley, then-assistant dean of the law school at Loyola University of New 
Orleans, signed on as legal advisor to the New Orleans-based Parents for Educational 
Justice formed in response to LEAP testing in 2000.  In an interview with Times 
Picayune, Quigley noted that the new LEAP 21 test for eighth graders was harder than 
college admissions tests.  He sent letters to then-State Superintendent Cecil Picard under 
the public records law for information regarding test development, old and new copies of 
LEAP tests, and names of the external contractors who developed the exam (Vaishnav, 
2000).  In response, House Education Committee chairman Carl Crane introduced 
legislation protecting the LEAP from the public records law and a resolution was passed 
exempting the LEAP from public records inspection in 2000.  The following year, New 
Orleans House representative Renee Gill Pratt introduced legislation making the LEAP 
tests just one factor in student promotion.  Again, chairman Carl Crane of the House 
Education Committee killed the bill as a threat to the state’s accountability program (The 
Advocate, 2001).  In an interview with The Advocate explaining the racial split over the 
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LEAP 21, Crane said, 
The tragedy of it all is the black population is the population that will benefit the 
most from high stakes testing and increased accountability in schools. (The 
Advocate, 2001, p. 10) 
State Superintendent Cecil Picard also felt the need to address the racial split over LEAP 
testing in a bulletin released to parents in 2001 called Reaching for results: A message 
from the superintendent (Louisiana Department of Education, 2001).  In a “Questions and 
Answers” section, criticism of the tests’ unfairness is addressed: 
Q. Won’t such a difficult test be unfair to poor and minority students? 
A. On the contrary, the LEAP 21 test, “high stakes” testing, and accountability 
ensure that all students who need extra help get it.  For many schools, that 
additional help means redirecting resources to students most in need. (Louisiana 
Department of Education, 2001, p. 3). 
The potential benefits to Blacks were promoted by state education officials and high 
ranking legislators, but many Blacks viewed the tests as a tool to weaken Black 
educational progress. The frenzy to implement tougher and more comprehensive 
promotional tests in Louisiana began during the desegregation period, and because of 
Governor Foster’s connections to White rights groups, Blacks grew even more suspicious 
of the LEAP 21 as a model for improving Black education.  In an editorial response to 
Crane’s comments about the benefits of LEAP 21 for Blacks, a Black lawyer from Baton 
Rouge wrote to the Advocate to protest Crane’s remarks. Her impassioned response bears 
the lengthy quotation, 
If this test is so “crucial to the future of education reform in Louisiana,” why is it 
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not given to all children in Louisiana?...It is not lost on us that the overwhelming 
majority of African-American children in this state attend public schools. It is also 
not lost on us that the overwhelming majority of children attending private and 
parochial schools in this state are White….  Certainly no one expects us to believe 
that the state of Louisiana is more concerned about African-American children 
that it is about White children.  If Louisiana wants to show concern for children, 
we must show that we are concerned for all of our children.  Administer this 
wonderful, God’s gift to education, “high stakes test,” to all the children in 
Louisiana, or administer it to none. (Advocate, 2002, p. 6) 
Many Blacks were alarmed by the large failure rates on the LEAP 21.  Blacks represented 
about 52 percent of all elementary schoolchildren taking the LEAP 21 in 1999 and about 
31 percent of schoolchildren in the state (Bankston & Caldas, 2002).  The secrecy, 
timing, and penalties associated with the LEAP fueled Blacks’ skepticism of high stakes 
testing as a school excellence reform model.  A former member of the 1986 LEAP testing 
commission noted that a perception of racial discrimination was dismissed under the 
necessity for ensuring all students possessed basic skills, 
At that time we had students who could not read about a fourth-grade level, but 
were passed along.  I believe the LEAP, when first applied in the 1990s, served an 
important purpose for measuring basic skills and I think the test was much fair.  
The commission understood that a racial bias may be perceived, which is why we 
took care to include a Black educator on the commission to oversee much of the 
development. (I. Hays, Personal communication, August 22, 2011) 
The LEAP remains a racially divisive issue in Louisiana because most of the 
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punitive effects of the LEAP are felt in the Black community.  Louisiana’s uneven testing 
policy follows a history of public education policy that reflect racial disparities (i.e. 
racially segregated schools, racially-differentiated curriculum, unequal school financing).    
 
Conclusion 
 Louisiana’s early public education policy sought standardization and achievement 
testing as means of assimilating the French-speaking, Catholic, and Creole population of 
the early twentieth century.  The state’s first achievement test was developed as a 
component of the State Supervisory Program in 1921.  The achievement tests were 
voluntary, but encouraged by education officials as a vehicle for promoting a standard 
model of curriculum and instruction in the Anglo-American tradition.  The State 
Supervisory Program discontinued during the Great Depression in 1933, but state interest 
in both intelligence and achievement testing resurfaced during the desegregation period.  
The tests became a featured component of the state’s desegregation policy, which limited 
Black student enrollment to majority-White schools.  Education officials touted student 
testing as a way of maintaining educational quality, but the main objective was to defy 
desegregation mandates. A wave of White boycotts to desegregated schools lead to 
increased Black enrollment in public schools but lesser political and financial support 
from state and local governments. As a result, public schools languished under financial 
disinvestment and student achievement lagged behind the national average. State 
legislators created the LEAP in 1986 to improve student achievement and prevent social 
promotion, but the LEAP more adversely impacted Black and poorer families in 
Louisiana. These groups are more adversely impacted because there is a higher 
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percentage of both Black and poor students in Louisiana and specifically at the K-8 grade 
level.  By contrast, decisions regarding educational funding, policy, and accountability 
are decided by a largely White and middle class demographic.  Racial and class division 
over the LEAP occurs because the middle class is concentrated in nonpublic schools that 
are exempt from high stakes testing, but the poorer classes are upheld to a strict standard 
of accountability. 
High stakes testing in Louisiana is a factor in student promotion and graduation 
for public schools only, yet there is little evidence that the high stakes testing program 
has improved student achievement overall. Recent National Assessment Educational 
Progress (NAEP) test scores can serve as a comparative assessment tool to monitor 
changes in Louisiana’s student achievement relative to national indices. NAEP scores 
indicate that Louisiana student achievement levels have remained the same since 1992. In 
1992, the difference between Louisiana NAEP fourth grade reading scores versus the 
national average was 11 points. In 2011, there was 10 point difference between Louisiana 
fourth grade reading scores and the national average. Louisiana’s eighth grade reading 
scores lagged behind the national average by 9 points in 1998, and they lagged behind the 
national average by 9 points in 2011.  Louisiana’s NAEP fourth grade math scores were 
11 points lower than the national average in 2011, and 27 percent of students scored 
below basic level.  Louisiana’s NAEP eighth grade math scores were 10 points below the 
national average, and there was no significant change in scores from 2009-2011. About 
37 percent of Louisiana students scored below basic on the NAEP eighth grade math 
assessment, and 78 percent scored at the basic level or below basic level in 2011. Recent 
NAEP scores indicate that student achievement in Louisiana has consistently lagged 
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behind the national average despite the intensive high stakes testing program (National 
Center for Education Statistics NAEP, 2011). 
A disturbing trend, however, is the drop-out rate in Louisiana that has increased 
since high stakes testing was introduced. In 2009, Louisiana had the highest drop-out rate 
in the country at 7.5 percent or 35,000 students (National Center for Education Statistics 
Dropout Rates, 2011). The drop-out rate is a problem because it limits a large population 
of Louisiana citizens to unskilled labor and fewer opportunities for socioeconomic 
mobility. Because there is a higher population of poorer students in the public schools, a 
situation in which tens of thousands of students drop out each year creates a cycle of 
poverty for many Louisiana families. In 2011, Louisiana Public Broadcasting (2011) 
aired a series called, “Dropout Dilemma: Louisiana’s Education Crisis” to investigate the 
drop-out issue and highlight solutions from the Louisiana Department of Education. In a 
feature story, journalists interviewed Scott Hughes as a representative of the Louisiana 
thinktank Alliance for Education. Hughes stated that most Louisiana students drop-out 
between grades 8 and 9 than at any other level in the K-12 system largely due to high 
stakes testing.  Louisiana loses more students between grades 8 and 9 than at any time 
during students’ K-12 career. Why is the eighth grade LEAP test playing such a large role 
in drop-out rates? It could be due to allegations made by Parents for Educational Justice 
and law professor Bill Quigley, who argued that the eighth grade LEAP test is more 
rigorous than college admissions tests. Quigley’s argument cannot be verified, however, 
because previous and current LEAP tests are protected from public disclosure under 
Louisiana state law.  
 The LEAP narrative presents a historical context that indicates race played a 
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factor in both the social foundations and political efforts to implement the LEAP.  Blacks, 
who dominated public schools in New Orleans and Baton Rouge by the 1990s, saw a 
dramatic increase in promotion and graduation as a result of civil rights gains and 
desegregation. However, these public schools harbored a negative image by a 
conservative White majority, and education officials at various levels sought to prevent 
social promotion by requiring students to demonstrate competency on a standardized test.  
The LEAP did not begin as a high stakes test in 1986, but punitive consequences became 
increasingly associated with students’ performance under Governor Mike Foster.  Foster 
supervised the expansion of high stakes testing policies in LEAP 21 that resulted in 
massive student failures in which thousands of students were retained or denied high 
school graduation.  The LEAP 21 became a racially divisive issue because of Foster’s 
relationships with Whites-rights groups and the predominance of Black failures on the 
test.  Blacks’ suspicion of the test increased when the LEAP was shielded from public 
records and review in 2000.   
 The current context of high stakes testing in Louisiana has expanded its focus 
from student promotion and graduation to teacher evaluation and tenure.  Louisiana 
officials were recipients of federal 2011 Race to the Top funding that awarded grants to 
states engaged in a new branch of standards-based reform (U.S. Department of Education 
Race to the Top Fund, 2011). Among the goals in the Race to the Top educational reform 
agenda are teacher merit pay, technology integration, data-driven instruction, and charter 
school options for chronically failing public schools. All of these elements have found 
some resonance in Louisiana—in particular the state’s the largest urban school district, 
New Orleans Public Schools. In efforts to improve student achievement in New Orleans, 
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state officials established the Recovery School District in 2006 as the largest charter 
school district in the country.  In the 2009-2010 school year, about 61 percent of New 
Orleans students were enrolled in charter schools that operate as privately run, publicly-
funded hybrids (Fenwick, 2010). The decentralized, privatization model that currently 
operates in New Orleans is now promoted as the solution to underachievement and 
represents a new shift in school reform—the free market model. The free market rationale 
argues that charters school operators should compete to produce the best educational 
programs, thereby boosting student achievement through market-driven methods.   
 However, the critical issue for New Orleans is that charter school operators are 
exempt from certain rules regarding teacher contracts and tenure, which has complicated 
the role of New Orleans’ large Black teacher population. Prior to 2005, New Orleans was 
home to the only concentration of African-American educators in the state of Louisiana. 
Over 73% of the classroom teachers in New Orleans Public Schools were African-
American, and a whopping 88% of school principals and administrators were African-
American (Louisiana Department of Education, 2004).  Members of the teachers union, 
the United Teachers of New Orleans, were the single largest group of educated, African-
American homeowners in the city (Center for Community Change, 2006).  In order to 
establish the new Recovery School District, the state closed traditional public schools and 
fired all New Orleans Public School employees en masse. The displaced teachers had to 
reapply as new hires and satisfy new testing requirements in the Recovery School 
District. In spite of earned Bachelor degrees, teaching experience, passing scores on the 
state teacher examination, and a successful record of teacher certification, the teachers 
had to pass a new examination initiated by the Recovery School District to screen new 
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applicants. In an essay written by a veteran New Orleans teacher, the disparity in the new 
testing requirements for New Orleans teachers versus other areas in Louisiana rings clear,  
Many highly qualified educators are not working in the new charter schools and 
the Recovery School District, because these districts are using unfair tactics to 
undermine the professionalism and the respect of veteran teachers. The test that 
these districts administer is an insult to the profession of teaching. Orleans Parish 
is the only district in which such tests take place. In any other school district, the 
state deems its certification system, which includes the national praxis exam, a 
good measure for hiring teachers. (Center for Community Change, 2006, 30-31) 
Second, the displaced teachers were often required to submit scores from teacher 
licensing exams, record of successful teaching (as evidenced through student test scores), 
and evaluations of teaching performance in the hiring process. Students’ test scores on 
state exams such as the LEAP are used as the central criterion for employment and 
contract renewal in many charter schools. There is a concern about the underlying 
assumptions of using student test scores to evaluate teacher quality and determine teacher 
pay. The LEAP narrative portrays a minimally-funded, yet high-demanding 
accountability program where the punitive effects largely impact Black and poor 
students. The firing of the state’s largest Black teaching population creates more poverty 
and instability in the city of New Orleans that negates the success of any school reform 
model. There is also a concern as to why New Orleans teachers were the only city 
population summarily fired when there are other school districts throughout the state that 
also reflect chronically low student achievement.  
 High stakes testing in Louisiana has made a strong impact on student promotion 
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and graduation, but its punitive consequences have gradually intensified to include 
teachers and communities.  The situation in Louisiana reflects a larger trend toward 
teacher accountability across the country.  Teachers are increasingly judged by students’ 
test scores on standardized tests, although there is an abundance of research indicating 
multiple factors of student achievement that include family background and school 
environment (eg., Coleman, 1966; Kohn, 2000; Kozol 2006). Teachers do play an 
important role in student learning, but it is problematic to apply the accountability matrix 
to teacher pay, evaluation, and tenure.  A report from the Educational Commission of the 
States (2010) reviewed four merit pay initiatives in school districts across the U.S.: 
Denver, Texas, Chicago, and Iowa. Investigators found there was no difference in student 
achievement between those participating in the merit pay program and those that did not. 
Despite this admission by the Educational Commission of the States, merit pay initiatives 
have begun in many states across the country, and are defended by the free market 
rationale of school reform that promotes competition and incentives to schools and 
teachers. However, as indicated by the history of the LEAP, there are social, racial, and 
economic subtexts within school reform discourse that complicate high stakes testing 
programs and their intended goals. Further research concerning the LEAP and similar 
high stakes testing programs is warranted to investigate larger implications on 
employment, poverty, school improvement, racial equality, and community progress. 
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